









Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Ji, K. (2013). Essays on tax policy, institutions, and output. CentER, Center for Economic Research.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021




Essays on tax policy, institutions and output
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan Tilburg Uni-
versity op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. dr. Ph.
Eijlander, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan
van een door het college voor promoties aangewezen
commissie in de aula van de Universiteit op vrijdag 8
november 2013 om 10.15 uur door
Kan Ji
geboren op 26 juni 1985 te Chongqing, P.R.China.
Promotiecommissie:
Promotor: prof. dr. Jan Magnus
Copromotor: dr. Pavel Č́ıžek
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Public Policy is defined as a system of “courses of action, regulatory measures, laws, and
funding priorities concerning a given topic promulgated by a governmental entity or its
representatives” by Dean Kilpatrick. According to this definition, public policy analysis
includes (i) what kind of problems do government want to tackle, and what other factors
(including cultural, social, economic, and political factors) drive government to adopt a
certain public policy? (ii) which factors may influence the outcome of a public policy,
such as institutional quality? (iii) how does a public policy affect economic performance
on national or regional level? Analysis of these three aspects requires understanding of
social realities in countries and appropriate quantitative approaches to test hypotheses
formulated from related economic theory.
My dissertation recognizes the key variables among complex socioeconomic condi-
tions, sets up an econometric model capable of explaining the causes underpinning the
policy decision, and predicts the effects of this policy on economic performance in one
country or several countries. The first part (Chapter 2) assesses how“West China Devel-
opment Drive”policy affected the relationship between abundant resources and economic
growth in China. Chapter 3 explores the causes and revenue consequences of flat income
taxes among 75 developed and transitional countries. Chapter 4 studies and compares
responses of the credit spread to exogenous tax policy changes in the U.S. and U.K.
Chapter 2 focuses on a problem in Chinese economy, that is the role of natural re-
sources in the economic growth of China, and the effect of “West China Development
Drive” policy on the role of resources. Since reformists within the Chinese Communist
Party initiated a program of economic reforms in December 1978, China has been the
world’s fastest-growing major economy with consistent growth rates of around 10% over
the past thirty years. At the same time the production of natural resources has in-
creased sharply. These natural resources are not evenly distributed over China. This
phenomenon gives rise to a question whether natural resource abundance is associated
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with such fast economic growth. Besides, the Chinese government proposed a policy
called West China Development Drive, aiming at promoting the economic development
of the West China. This policy has particular emphasis on intensifying natural re-
source exploitation, and several significant projects connected with natural resources in
West-China have resulted from this initiative. For example, the West-East natural gas
transmission project led to an increase of natural gas production in Sichuan and Qinghai
provinces by more than 100% and 900%, respectively, between 2000 and 2007. Also,
steel production in Yunan and Guizhou provinces increased by around 200% and 400%,
respectively, since the Drive began. The economic growth rate in Western provinces
has indeed increased since 2000. We thus are interested in whether and how this policy
affects the resource effect on economic growth.
Different from existing Chinese studies of natural resources, this chapter employs
more reliable data and investigates the resource effects. First, we propose several new
measurements of resource abundance. We differentiate resource reserves (a stock mea-
sure) and resource revenues (a flow measure), and these measures are considered to
be less endogenous than conventional dependence measures. Second, we re-examine the
role of institutional quality in the relationship between resource abundance and economic
growth. As a measure of institutional quality, we propose to use the confidence in courts
surveyed in 1995 by the World Bank. We also employ a functional-coefficient model to
investigate whether and how the effect of resource abundance on economic growth de-
pends on institutional quality, because classical growth regressions cannot fully capture
the non-linear resource effect on economic growth in China. The functional-coefficient
estimates indicate that resource abundance is strongly related to economic growth in
regions where institutional quality is weak, and weakly related in regions where institu-
tional quality is moderate. To examine whether the relationship between resources and
growth is different before and after the West China Development Drive, we employ both
a standard and a time-varying coefficient panel-data approach. The availability of panel
data is important because, by allowing not only variation over provinces but also over
time, we are able to capture the short-run dynamic behavior of the resource effect as well
as other impacts on economic growth. Both the standard panel-data approach and the
time-variant model show that the West China Development Drive has had an important
impact on the role of resources in the economy. By intensifying resource exploitation of
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the Western provinces, the Drive has led to an income rise in the West. This increased
income helped the local economy for a short period, but not for long, possibly because
an overemphasis on resource exploitation in some Western provinces crowded out other
sectors to some extent.
Chapter 3 studies which factors have determined the adoption of flat income taxes and
whether these taxes have been effective in raising revenue. The flat income tax was first
proposed by Hall and Rabushka (1985), which refers to a tax structure in which the same,
single tax rate is levied on both business income and individual employment income. In
practice, policy makers and academics have adopted a much more loose definition of a
single positive marginal tax rate on labor income. In the last decade, 28 jurisdictions
adopted a flat income tax as of 2011. Although the introduction of flat income taxes
has been widely recognized as an important development in tax policies, existing studies
about flat taxes are rather insufficient in the following aspects: First, little attention has
been paid to the question of what drives countries to adopt a flat income tax. Second,
the literature on the economic consequences of the flat tax is primarily informal in nature
and extremely sparse. Third, Most studies pertain to individual country experiences.
Therefore, Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by taking a first cut on unraveling
the determinants of flat tax adoption. We propose four hypotheses. First, countries
display copycat effect behavior: countries adopt a flat tax because other countries in
the same region have already done so. Second, Countries of lower institutional quality
are more likely to adopt a flat income tax. Third, the presence of an IMF program
will increase the likelihood of a country adopting a flat income tax. Finally, countries
with right-leaning social preferences are more likely to adopt a flat income tax. As for
the revenue effect of the flat income tax, it is very hard to say whether it is positive or
negative on the basis of current literature and world experience, thus we do not propose
any hypothesis related to the revenue consequence of the flat income tax.
Besides, this chapter adopts more systematic econometric estimation methods in
analyzing the determinants and the revenue effect of the flat income tax, respectively.
To model the adoption of flat income taxes, we use Cox’s proportional hazard model.
We do not use a dynamic probit model because it assumes the normality of error terms,
which is not the case in flat tax adoption: once a flat tax is adopted, it is hard to
repeal it, leading to an asymmetric, autocorrelated, and possibly bimodal distribution
3
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of time. Therefore, using the dynamic probit model may lead to biased and inconsistent
estimates. To investigate the impact of a flat income tax on tax revenue, we estimate
the revenue equation by using the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). Furthermore, since lagged levels of variables are likely to be
weak instruments for first-differenced dependent variables, we employ a system GMM
approach (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
Last but not least, this chapter is the first cross-country study on the revenue effects
of flat income tax adoption. We use a unique panel dataset of 75 industrialized and devel-
oping countries during 1990–2011. In the adoption equation, we include four variables of
interest related to four hypotheses of determinants of the flat tax adoption—the copycat
effect, the institutional quality, the IMF program dummy, and the party orientation. In
addition to the variables of interest discussed above, we also include variables taken from
the tax effort literature. To account for unobserved heterogeneity at the regional level,
we employ five regional dummies based on Ebrill et al.’s (2001) classification. For the
revenue equation, the dependent variable is the ratio of tax revenue to GDP. The rev-
enue equation incorporates all the previously discussed independent variables except the
copycat effect. In addition to these, we also consider population, a federation dummy, a
variable for resource wealth, and demographic variables. The results show that countries
with lower institutional quality, participation in an IMF lending program, right-leaning
social preferences, and more neighbors having already adopted a flat income tax are more
likely to adopt a flat tax. We also find tentative evidence that the flat income tax is an
effective instrument in raising tax revenue, particularly when countries feature a small
agricultural sector, do not have a high level of income per capita, and higher institutional
quality.
In the final chapter, we investigate how the tax policy changes affect the credit spread.
The credit spread is the difference between the loan rate and the deposit rate, and this
value skyrocketed internationally during the 2008 debt crisis. Many theoretical researches
reveal the relationship between bank lending, credit spreads, and the business cycle.
However, the recent crisis has shown that the monetary-policy interest rate has almost
reached its limits: in many cases, including the U.S. and U.K., it was soon effectively at
the zero lower bound. Therefore, the role of fiscal stimulus as a countercyclical policy is
now being reconsidered. Traditionally, fiscal policies are regarded to play a rather limited
4
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role as a stabilizing tool in the mainstream business-cycle literature (due to Ricardian
equivalence arguments and its minor effects on price and output-gap stability), there has
been little direct investigation into the relationship between the fiscal stimulus and the
credit spread. In this chapter we attempt to fill the gap in the literature by exploring
how the credit spread reacts to tax-policy changes.
In analyses of the impacts of fiscal policy changes, it is crucial to correctly identify
exogenous policy shocks. Different from most existing papers that identify policy shocks
based on the recursive identification scheme (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002 and Melina
and Villa, 2011), we consider a Romer–Romer narrative identification approach in com-
bination with a recursive scheme to identify exogenous tax changes. This measure is
advantageous to recursive scheme since it identifies motives of tax policy changes from
official records and can effectively isolate tax policy changes which are not responding
to, or influenced by, current or future economic conditions. We combine the narra-
tive and recursive approaches for identification. In the structural vector autoregressive
(SVAR) models, we first place the exogenous tax changes constructed by Romer and
Romer (2010) and Cloyne (2011), followed by government spending and then by output.
We assume that the government spending does not react to contemporaneous shocks of
output due to the policy lag, which is a popular assumption in a recursive SVAR. By
doing so, we effectively combine the narrative and recursive approaches.
In this chapter we compare U.S. with U.K. The comparison is interesting in three
aspects. First, the U.S. is typically considered to be a closed economy, while the U.K. is
regarded as a small open economy. Second, tax policy is highly centralized in the U.K.,
but this is not the case in the U.S. Third, announcements of tax changes almost always
become law in the U.K. (Cloyne, 2011) but not in U.S. We study the effect of tax-change
shocks by estimating a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model and a factor-
augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model. Small-scale VAR models include only
a few variables, so they suffer from the limited-information problem and are unlikely to
correctly estimate the fiscal-policy shock. The FAVAR model extends traditional VAR
techniques and uses a large number of variables driven by a much smaller number of eco-
nomic shocks. This rich information helps to mitigate the limited-information problem
and to eliminate the omitted-variable bias. We extract common factors from variables
that describe all aspects of the general economic situation, including real activities, in-
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flation, the money market, and asset prices. The impulse responses of the credit spread
from FAVAR and SVAR are consistent: we find that in both the U.S. and the U.K., tax-
policy shocks significantly affect the credit spread. These responses are not completely
explained by business-cycle fluctuations induced by tax changes. This has important
theoretical implications. In the existing literature on the relationship between the busi-
ness cycle and the credit spread, credit-spread changes amplify the impacts of various
shocks on the output. The countercyclical feature of credit-spread changes is the source
of this amplification effect. However, our results suggest that credit-spread changes may




quality, and economic growth in
China1
2.1. Introduction
Since reformists within the Chinese Communist Party initiated a program of economic
reforms in December 1978, China has been the world’s fastest-growing major economy
with consistent growth rates of around 10% over the past thirty years. China is also the
largest exporter and second largest importer of goods in the world. At the same time the
production of natural resources has increased sharply. These natural resources are not
evenly distributed over China: the coal mines are primarily located in eight provinces,
all in the North-East and North, while most natural gas reserves can be found in the
Mid-West, especially in Sichuan province which accounts for almost 30% of the nation’s
production of natural gas. Regions with a high production of natural resources have
generally developed slower than low-producing regions, a phenomenon which resembles
the situation where resource-rich countries perform worse than resource-scarce countries,
the so-called ‘curse of resources’.
The ‘curse of resources’ hypothesis has been analyzed in many cross-country stud-
ies, both from empirical and theoretical viewpoints, but there have not been many
within-country studies examining the relationship between natural resources and eco-
nomic growth. A notable exception is the study by Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004), who
employed data from 49 states in the USA, and concluded that resource-scarce states
outperform resource-rich states. Like the USA, China is endowed with several unique
characteristics which make it suitable for testing the resource curse hypothesis. First,
1This chapter is coauthored with Jan R. Magnus and Wendun Wang.
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China has homogeneous constitution, law, and governance structures (but different in-
stitutions) across provinces. Second, there are significant differences between provincial
economies, and substantial variation in resource endowments and development. Third,
market reforms have lifted restrictions on the flows of products, labor, and capital Zhang
et al. (2008). In addition, the price reforms in China’s natural resource sector between
the late 1970s and the mid-1990s ensure that the resource prices largely reflect market
supply and demand.
Recently, a number of studies have appeared on the relationship between resources
and economic growth in China. Xu and Wang (2006) were the first to use panel-data
methods, and they found evidence supporting the curse of resources at the provincial
level. Shao and Qi (2009) confirmed these results and compared the resource effects be-
fore and after the ‘West China Development Drive’ in 2000, by estimating two samples
(before and after the policy change) separately. Their results suggest that the 2000 pol-
icy change induced a resource curse. Zhang et al. (2008) employed a panel-data set at
the provincial level and associated a slower growth rate of per capita consumption with
rich resources, especially in rural regions. Fan et al. (2012) used city-level data to an-
alyze the transmission mechanism of resource curse and diffusion processes of resources
among cities. They found no evidence of a resource curse in China, and they showed
that resources have a positive diffusion effect among neighboring cities within the same
province.
Some caution is required in interpreting these results. First, no distinction is made
between resource abundance and resource dependence. For example, Xu and Wang
(2006) measured resource abundance by the proportion of mining workers or by the ratio
of investment in the mining industry to total fixed asset investment. These measurements
capture resource dependence rather than resource abundance, and the effect of these two
concepts on economic growth is not necessarily the same (Brunnschweiler and Bulte,
2008). In addition, the measurement of resource dependence suffers from endogeneity
(Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Norman, 2009; van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2010).
The current paper measures resource abundance rather than resource dependence, thus
avoiding these problems. Second, the analysis of the critical role of institutions in the
association between resource abundance and economic growth is not satisfactory. Not
only is the measurement of institutional quality poor, but also important nonlinearities
8
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are ignored (Ross, 2001). Finally, while panel-data methods capture short-run dynamics,
they are typically not powerful in explaining the long-run effect of natural resources.
Conventional panel-data models estimate constant slope coefficients, implicitly assuming
that the resource effect does not change over time. This may, however, not be the case
in China, especially for regions with significant structural breaks such as the West China
Development Drive.
In this paper, we study the interplay between resource abundance, institutional qual-
ity, and economic growth in China. We also investigate whether the resource effect on
economic growth varies over time. Our paper makes four main contributions in the
context of provincial China. First, we propose several new measurements of resource
abundance. These new measurements consider resource abundance either as a stock or
as a flow, thus allowing a comparison between in situ resource reserves (a stock) and
resource revenues (a flow, usually referred to as a ‘windfall gain’). Second, we re-examine
the role of institutional quality in the relationship between resource abundance and eco-
nomic growth. Institutional quality is proxied by confidence in the courts, using data
from the World Bank. We investigate whether and how the effect of resource abundance
on economic growth depends on institutional quality, employing a functional-coefficient
model. Our results show that the effect of resource abundance in China depends on in-
stitutional quality in a nonlinear fashion, which can not be fully captured using a linear
model. More importantly, we find — in contrast to Mehlum et al. (2006) — that the
effect of natural resources is more positive for provinces with poor institutional quality.
Third, we consider the West China Development Drive as a significant policy shock that
may influence the effect of resource abundance on economic growth. We employ both a
standard panel-data model and a time-varying coefficient model to study whether and
how the resource effect changes after the policy shock. Finally, our paper uses both cross-
section and panel data to explore the effect of natural resource abundance on economic
growth. The advantage of cross-section data is that they better capture the long-run
effect, and reduce the possible bias caused by economic fluctuations. The advantage of
panel data is that they contain more information on the dynamics.
We employ provincial data over the period 1990–2008. Our results are not in gen-
eral agreement with most of the current literature. First, the cross-section benchmark
model shows no evidence of a resource curse. Second, the difference-in-difference ap-
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proach shows that the interaction effect of resource abundance and institutional quality
is positive but not significant, suggesting that the interaction effect may not be linear.
Third, extending the benchmark model, the functional-coefficient estimates indicate that
resource abundance is strongly related to economic growth in regions where institutional
quality is weak, and weakly related in regions where institutional quality is moderate.
Fourth, both the standard panel-data approach and the time-variant model show that the
West China Development Drive has had an important impact on the role of resources in
the economy. By intensifying resource exploitation of the Western provinces, the Drive
has led to an income rise in the West. This increased income helped the local econ-
omy for a short period, but not for long, possibly because an overemphasis on resource
exploitation in some Western provinces crowded out other sectors to some extent.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we briefly review the theories relating
resources and institutional quality, and formulate the questions raised in this paper.
In Section 2.3 we describe the data, and present some characteristics and preliminary
analysis. In Section 2.4 we present the cross-section analysis, and in Section 2.5 the
panel-data analysis. Some conclusions are offered in Section 2.6.
2.2. Resources and institutional quality
Ever since the 1950s, economists have observed that resource-rich countries may grow
slower than resource-scarce countries. Why do abundant resources tend to impede eco-
nomic growth? Several theories have been developed, mainly Dutch disease models
(Sachs and Warner, 1995) and institutional explanations. Traditional Dutch disease ex-
planations cannot be directly applied in the Chinese context, because most of China’s
exports are not expensive for other countries to buy because labor is inexpensive in
China. While it is possible to study the ‘Dutch disease’ among provinces, an adapted
definition and appropriate data would be required. Due to the data limitations, we focus
here on institutional quality explanations.
Many papers have stressed the importance of institutions through which abundant re-
sources may curse economic growth. From a qualitative point of view, resource revenues
appear to be easily appropriable, thus leading to rent-seeking behavior and corruption.
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Also, more labor is attracted to seek revenues from other productive activities (Isham
et al., 2005; Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Norman, 2009). Auty (2001) argued that re-
source wealth promotes the ascendance of the ‘predatory state’ over the ‘development
state’, either by encouraging the former through corruption or by undermining the latter
when revenues associated with resource extraction reduce the efficiency of policy and
administration. The relationship between resources and institutions also depends on the
type of resources. Many studies show that ‘point’ (concentrated) resources result in poor
institutions, while ‘diffuse’ resources do not. This is because point resources (such as
oil, minerals, and plantations) are extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base,
and can be protected and controlled at a relatively modest cost. In contrast, diffuse nat-
ural resources (such as agricultural products) are spread in space and utilized by agents
characterized by horizontal relationships (Bulte et al., 2005). The latter are therefore
less correlated with institutional quality.
From a quantitative point of view, Leite and Weidmann (1999) were perhaps the
first to demonstrate the effect of resource abundance on institutional quality. Mehlum
et al. (2006) interacted natural resource abundance with institutional quality and found
that the negative effect of natural resources on economic growth only occurs in countries
with poor institutional quality. Ross (2001) argued that institutions themselves may also
be endogenous and not invariant with respect to resource endowments. Some empirical
studies claim that institutional quality alone can explain a great deal of cross-country dif-
ferences in economic development, thus further questioning the role of natural resources
in economic development (Acemoglu et al., 2001).
The economy of China is in transition, hence it is a mixture of a market economy and
a planned economy. This mixture is also reflected in the resource market. Before 1990 the
Chinese central government controlled the price of most natural resources. During the
1990s the pricing of resources was reformed, and the prices were adjusted to international
levels. This is still the case today. In particular, the domestic oil price is adjusted based
on the oil markets in Singapore, Rotterdam, and New York, and fluctuates with market
demand. The domestic natural gas price is lower than the international price, but it is
still determined by the market.
The quality of institutions in China varies significantly over provinces. Chinese pro-
vinces possess homogeneous constitutional and legal systems, but their institutional qual-
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ity differs widely for historical, regional, political, and other reasons. For example, coastal
provinces typically have better institutions than inland provinces, partly because they
are more open, and partly because some coastal provinces enjoy preferential treatment
since the ‘reform and open policy’ initiated in 1978. These special features help us to
study the interplay of resource abundance, institutional quality, and economic growth.
We try to answer two questions. The first question is whether and how the effect of
resource abundance on economic growth depends on institutional quality. It is, of course,
possible that the resource effect on economic growth may also be dependent on some other
variables besides institutional quality, such as manufacturing, R&D, education, and so
on (see Fan et al., 2012). We shall focus on the interaction effect of institutional quality,
and try to provide explanations how and why institutional quality influences the resource
effect on economic growth. The second question is whether the association between
resources and economic growth varies over time. Since the West China Development
Drive had an emphasis on natural resources, the resources in the Western provinces
were exploited more intensively. The economic growth rate in the Western provinces has
indeed increased after the Drive was initiated. It is therefore possible that the association
between resources and growth is different before and after the policy change, a hypothesis
that will be formally tested.
2.3. Data and descriptive statistics
We consider 28 mainland ‘provinces’ in China, namely 22 provinces, 4 municipalities
directly under the central government, and 2 autonomous regions. Three autonomous
regions (Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet) are excluded because of lack of data.
Each province is labeled either ‘West’ or ‘East’ depending on its geographic location; see
Figure 2.1.
In studying natural resource abundance and its effect on growth, we distinguish
between a stock measure (RAs, resource reserves) and a flow measure (RAf , resource
revenues). Resource reserves are a measure of in situ resource wealth, while resource
revenues measure the flow of income from extracting resource stocks at some point in
time. Although the two measurements are likely to be highly correlated, the distinction
12
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Figure 2.1: Map of China
Note: The provinces left of the black solid line are defined as Western regions, most of which are affected
by the West China Development Drive policy. More precisely, the West China Development Drive
policy covers Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang,
Inner Mongolia, and Guangxi. Source: Chinasource website, http://www.chsource.org/site/index.php.
Although Shanxi province is usually treated as a central region, it is grouped here as a Western region
since its economic structure is more like the Western provinces and it is covered by the West China
Development Drive policy. Guangxi province is defined here as a Western province for the same reason.
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is useful because some provinces may be rich in resource reserves, while their income does
not depend primarily on resource exploitation. Also, it is not clear whether resources
in the ground have the same effect on economic growth as flows of resource revenues
do (Norman, 2009). Both measures differ from resource dependence, the typically used
(though not very good) proxy for resource abundance.
The question whether resource abundance is exogenous or endogenous has been em-
phasized by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008). Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010)
pointed out that abundance may not be as exogenous as it seems, and suggested that
the historic resource stocks used by Norman (2009) are less endogenous than other mea-
sures. We agree with this suggestion and follow Norman (2009) in measuring resource
reserves as the recent (2003) observed level of reserves plus total production during the
preceding years, including both energy and mineral resources. The energy resources in-
clude petroleum, natural gas, and coal mining. The mineral resources cover all major
mineral resources in China and include iron ore, manganese ore, chrome ore, vanadium
ore, native ilmenite, copper ore, lead ore, zinc ore, bauxite, magnesite, pyrite, phosphate
ore, and kaolin. All resource data at the regional level are taken from the China Sta-
tistical Yearbook. Because of lack of data in the early years, we can only construct the
stock values in 1999 using 1999 prices of resources. Stock values rather than physical
quantities are used to enhance comparability across resources, as suggested by Norman
(2009). Although stock values may vary a little depending on the price, exploitation
technology, and other factors, values in the early years are preferred because they are
likely to influence government behavior in later years (Norman, 2009; Van der Ploeg
and Poelhekke, 2010). Measuring resource reserves in this way should mitigate (but not
eliminate) the endogeneity.
Resource revenues are measured by sales income of resources (after adjusting for
inflation), and also include energy and mineral resources. Besides the resources covered
in the measure of resource reserves, resource revenues include additional resources such
as subterranean heat (energy), nickel ore, tungsten ore, and tin ore (mineral). These
additional resources account for less than 20% of sales income on average. (The sales
income documented in the Yearbook is the sum of all types of resources, and there are
no statistics that allow us to compute sales income covering exactly the same types
of energy and mineral resources as the reserves measure.) Since reserves and revenues
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include almost the same types of resources, we largely rule out the possibility that their
difference lies in the different types of resources that they measure.
Compared to other measures used in the literature, our resource abundance measures
are less affected by other economic activities, and thus serve as better proxies of resource
abundance. We are, however, aware of some weaknesses of our measures. For example,
even resource reserves tend to be measured as economically recoverable reserves and
are thus subject to changes in prices and technology. Besides, we cannot recover the
resource stocks in some of the early years, e.g. 1990, due to lack of data. If these data
were available, this would reduce the endogeneity of the resource reserves measure. As
for resource revenues, one worry is whether our results will be affected by considering
production cost. We check this by experimenting with different measures of revenues,
in particular net profit of resources and gross industrial output of resources. Estimation
results based on different measures are highly consistent. These measures are also highly
correlated (correlation > 0.94), suggesting that production costs differ only marginally
across provinces. Therefore we will present our results using sales income of resources,
because it is the most complete measure without missing values. The resource revenues
measure may be less exogenous than reserves due to market conditions, but the two
measures are closely related since resource stocks can be converted into flows of money
(Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008). The time-varying feature of the revenues measure
allows us to examine the short-run (dynamic) relation between resources and growth,
while the reserves measure is time-invariant.
The economy-related variables include economic growth, institutional quality, R&D,
industrial development, private sector employment, foreign investment, and initial eco-
nomic level. All of these, except institutional quality and initial economic level, contain
observations over several years for each province. The time span varies across variables.
We emphasize the role and measurement of institutional quality. This is a difficult
concept to measure. In cross-country studies one typically uses systematic indicators such
as the rule of law or government competitiveness (Knack and Keefer, 1995). But within
China the constitution and law in one province is the same as in another province. In
Chinese studies, institutional quality is therefore often ignored or measured using dubious
proxies, such as the ratio of total trade over GDP (Xu and Wang, 2006; Shao and Qi,
2009). We propose to use the confidence in courts surveyed in 1995 by the World Bank as
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a measure of institutional quality. This is a subjective measure, reflecting perceptions of
people from 114 cities. Chinese courts are divided into four levels. The highest level is the
supreme court in Beijing, and the other three levels are the so-called people’s courts: high
courts, intermediate courts, and basic courts. Appointments at the different levels of the
people’s courts are made by corresponding strata of the people’s congresses. Therefore,
unlike most of western countries where courts and government have independent power,
local courts in China are often influenced by local power cliques. The confidence in courts
therefore reflects not only the perceived justice of the courts but also the behavior of the
government, and thus captures the essence of institutional quality. The subjectivity of the
proposed measure is a potential weakness in that it sometimes differs from an objective
measure and could be biased, as suggested by Olken (2009) in a different context. Such a
difference or bias (if present) would however be largely averaged out, since we work with
aggregated provincial data. An advantage of the subjective measure is that it is based on
the perception of several aspects of government behavior, and thus reflects many aspects
of institution. It is therefore more general than a specific objective measure, which
typically captures only one aspect of government behavior, e.g. corruption, efficiency, or
intervention in the economy. Our measure is also likely to be more stable, because it is
formed over a period of time, and thus reflects underlying features of local institutions
that are not easily changed in the short run. This is especially relevant in rural China,
where people are not well-informed about the latest changes of government behavior,
and therefore do not rapidly adjust their perceptions, once formed.
The measurement of all variables and their time span is briefly described below.
G Growth of real GDP per capita. In the cross-section analysis, growth is averaged





where T = 2008 and T0 = 1990. In the panel-data analysis, it is defined as the
annual growth rate of real GDP per capita:
Gt = log(GDPt/GDPt−1) (t = 1991, . . . , 2008).
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RAs Log of resource reserves in Chinese Yuan per capita. The variable is constructed by
first summing the per capita stock values of all types of resources, and then taking
the logarithm. The stock value of a resource is the product of its reserves and its
average market price in the corresponding year. The reserve values are constructed
using an estimate of the reserves in 1999, obtained by adding extraction flows from
1999 to 2003 to the 2003 ‘reserve base’. The resource reserves cover energy resources
and mineral resources (types of energy and mineral resources are given above).
RAf Log of resource revenues in Chinese Yuan per capita. The resource revenues are
measured by sales income of resources after adjusting for inflation, covering both
energy and mineral resources, from 1999 to 2008.
INS Institutional quality, measured by confidence in the courts, which is a weighted
average of city level data. The weights are given by the proportion of the city’s
GDP in the province. (We also used the proportion of a city’s population as weights
as a robustness check.) Only cross-section data in 1995 are available.
R&D Research and development, the ratio of government expenditure in R&D to total
government expenditure, from 1995 to 2006.
IND Industrial development, ratio of value-added of industry to GDP, from 1992 to 2008.
PSE Private sector employment, also referred to as private economic activity, measured
by the number of people in not-state-owned companies divided by the provincial
population, from 1992 to 2008.
FI Foreign investment proportion, the ratio of the actual inflow of foreign investment
over gross investment in fixed assets, from 1989 to 2003. This captures the impor-
tance of foreign investment in the local economy.
INIT Initial economic level in Chinese Yuan per capita, defined as the logarithm of real
GDP per capita in 1989.
WEST Geographic dummy: WEST = 1 if the province lies in the Western region of
China (as defined in Figure 2.1) and WEST = 0 otherwise.
The resource reserves data are taken from the China Statistical Yearbook (National Bu-
reau of Statistics, 2003–2004) and the China Economic Information Network (CEINET).
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Resource revenues data are taken from the China Land and Resources Statistical Year-
book (Ministry of Land and Resources, 2000–2009). The economy-related variables are
either from CEINET or from the World Bank.
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of economy-related variables
Entire sample East sample West sample
(28 prov) (18 prov) (10 prov)
Variable Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Growth 0.0394 0.0054 0.0411 0.0054 0.0364 0.0039
RAs 4.4511 1.0375 4.3193 1.2015 4.8292 0.6398
RAf 2.0758 0.3855 2.0238 0.4224 2.2522 0.3584
INS 58.146 13.321 62.009 11.758 51.199 12.963
R&D 0.0097 0.0046 0.0111 0.0053 0.0073 0.0013
IND 0.2875 0.0665 0.2973 0.0752 0.2698 0.0452
PSE 0.0655 0.0278 0.0763 0.0283 0.0461 0.0126
FI 0.0963 0.0928 0.1305 0.0991 0.0347 0.0266
INIT 3.1876 0.2068 3.2626 0.2118 3.0527 0.1100
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics of the economy-related and resource variables.
By comparing the statistics of the East sample to the West sample, we see that the
average growth rate in Eastern provinces is generally higher than in Western provinces.
On the other hand, Western provinces have slightly higher resource reserves and revenues
than Eastern provinces. The institutional quality is generally better in the Eastern
provinces than in the Western provinces. Also, R&D, industrialization, private sector
employment, and foreign investment in the East are all higher on average than in the
West.
2.4. Cross-section analysis
We analyze the data first as a cross section, and then, in Section 2.5, as a panel. We
begin by reconsidering the classical growth regression




θkxk + ǫ1, (2.1)
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where G denotes economic growth, RA is resource abundance, INS represents institu-
tional quality, and
(






contain auxiliary control variables: research and development (R&D), industrial develop-
ment (IND), private sector employment (PSE), foreign investment (FI), initial economy
level (INIT), and the Western dummy (WEST). The auxiliary variables affect the econ-
omy and are associated with resource abundance. Their inclusion will therefore reduce
the omitted variable bias. For resource abundance, we always consider two variants: one
where RA is measured as a stock (RAs, resource reserves) and one where it is measured
as a flow (RAf , resource revenues).
Table 2.2: Economic growth: classical growth model
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
RAs −0.0001 0.0002 −0.0037
(−0.22) (0.26) (−0.76)
RAf 0.0001 0.0006 −0.0099
(0.08) (0.26) (−1.36)
INS 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0003
(2.76) (2.76) (1.85) (2.02) (−0.52) (−0.96)
R&D 0.3074 0.3011 0.3921 0.4391
(1.87) (2.03) (1.74) (1.96)
IND 0.0217 0.0210 0.0172 0.0194
(1.96) (1.92) (1.32) (1.76)
PSE 0.1359 0.1320 0.1583 0.1417
(2.04) (2.43) (2.23) (2.62)
FI 0.0258 0.0269 0.0284 0.0279
(2.76) (2.56) (2.94) (2.65)
INIT −0.0053 −0.0051 −0.0304 −0.0296 −0.0345 −0.0328
(−1.06) (−0.99) (−4.07) (−4.68) (−3.87) (−5.39)
WEST −0.0035 −0.0036 −0.0016 −0.0016 −0.0014 −0.0012
(−1.29) (−1.29) (−0.62) (−0.58) (−0.52) (−0.45)
RA× INS 0.0001 0.0002
(0.82) (1.39)
Constant 0.0465 0.0448 0.1089 0.1066 0.1392 0.1392
(2.38) (2.12) (6.18) (5.47) (3.28) (4.79)
R2 0.4579 0.4574 0.6829 0.6832 0.6913 0.6996
p-value of F -test 0.0022 0.0022 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: t-values are in parentheses. The number of observations in each column is 28.
The least-squares estimation results are presented in Table 2.2. Columns (a) and (b)
show that the impact of resource abundance is very weak, both when measured as a
stock (resource reserves) and when measured as a flow (resource revenues). The effect
of institutional quality is strong and positive. If other explanatory variables are added
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(columns (c) and (d)), then the significance of institutional quality slightly decreases but
it remains strong, while the resource effect remains insignificant. Equation (2.1) seems to
imply that resource abundance has no effect on economic growth, but such a conclusion
would be premature and incorrect. Classical growth regressions cannot fully capture
the resource effect in China, because the resource effect is likely to vary with institu-
tional quality. It is possible that natural resources are important in provinces with poor
institutional quality, but less important in provinces with strong institutional quality.
Classical growth regressions ignore such provincial heterogeneity by assuming constant
coefficients for each explanatory variable. The estimated coefficient in the presented
classical growth regression is the ‘overall’ effect of resource abundance, and its insignif-
icance does not imply that heterogenous effects are also insignificant for various levels
of institutional quality. In fact, we shall see that provincial heterogeneity is essential in
explaining the role of resource abundance.
Thus motivated, we extend the classical models by including an interaction term
RA×INS, as suggested by Mehlum et al. (2006). We estimate the regression model




θkxk + ǫ2. (2.2)
The estimation results are given in columns (e) and (f) of Table 2.2. We see that the
interaction term is positive, but not significant. This result weakly supports the argument
by Mehlum et al. (2006) that resource abundance promotes the economy if institutions
are producer-friendly. The insignificance of the interaction term suggests that the linear
model may not fully capture the interaction effect of resources and institutional quality in
China. Note that Equation (2.2) only provides a positive or negative (linear) interaction
effect, and that this effect is the same for all institutional quality levels. However, if
resource effects on growth depend nonlinearly on institutional quality, then (2.2) does
not capture this.
In order to capture a possibly nonlinear relationship between resource abundance and
economic growth, we consider the functional coefficient model




γkxk + ǫ3. (2.3)
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The same variables RA and x1, . . . , x6 appear in Equation (2.3) as in Equation (2.1),
except that institutional quality INS enters through the coefficients δ0, δ1, and γk (k =
1, 2, . . . , 6). Since there is no a priori reason why some of the coefficients would and
others would not depend on institutional quality, we allow all coefficients to be functions
of institutional quality. The advantage of a functional-coefficient model is that it provides
information on how the interaction varies (possibly nonlinearly) across different levels of
institutional quality. A second advantage is that it solves the potential reverse causality
between institutional quality and growth, at least to some extent, because institutional
quality enters the model as a smoothing variable instead of a control variable.
The parameters in this model are estimated by local linear estimation (Fan and
Gijbels, 1996; see also Cai et al., 2000). Thus, we specify
δj = δCj + δSj(INS− u0) (j = 0, 1),
γk = γCk + γSk(INS− u0) (k = 1, 2, . . . , 6),
where min(INS) ≤ u0 ≤ max(INS). The parameters (δCk, δSk) and (γCk, γSk) are esti-
mated nonparametrically. Various data-driven methods can be employed for selecting
the bandwidth. We chose the bandwidth by minimizing the average mean squared error
(Cai et al., 2000).
Figure 2.2: Marginal effect of RAs and RAf on economic growth as a function of
institutional quality
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In Figure 2.2 we show how the δ1-parameter changes as a function of institutional
quality. The solid line plots the estimate of δ1, and the dashed lines are 5% confidence
intervals based on jackknife standard errors. We see that resource reserves and resource
revenues largely measure the same concept of abundance (when applied to growth re-
gressions in China). The typical ‘U-shape’ in both subfigures shows strong and positive
correlation between resource abundance and economic growth in provinces with weak
institutional quality. As institutional quality improves, this correlation decreases and
becomes statistically insignificant. These results provide an explanation of the insignif-
icance of the resource effect in Equation (2.1). The reason for the insignificant ‘overall’
effect (columns (a)–(d) in Table 2.2) is that the resource effect varies with institutional
quality and that this effect is weak in provinces with good institutional quality. The
nonlinear behavior in both subfigures also explains the statistical insignificance of the
interaction term (columns (e) and (f) in Table 2.2).
In general, resource abundance in China thus has a positive effect on economic growth.
This evidence obviously challenges the existence of a resource curse. In fact it supports
Brunnschweiler and Bulte’s (2008) argument that resource abundance promotes economic
growth, which they explain by the ‘windfall’ flow of income from resource extraction.
This flow, they argue, has a direct effect on the economy as well as an indirect effect
through improving institutional quality.
The positive effect of resource abundance is particularly strong in regions with weak
institutional quality, and the effect decreases as institutional quality improves. This find-
ing differs from the cross-country evidence reported by Mehlum et al. (2006), who find
that worse institutions make the effect of natural resources more negative. A possible
explanation is that regions with weak institutional quality are likely to rely more on their
primary industries than regions with strong institutional quality, because the prosperity
of many non-resource sectors is largely built on good institutional quality. For example,
good institutions lead to more willingness of savers to invest in firms and to a higher
effectiveness of corporate governance, thus associating good institutions with a healthy
financial sector (Beck and Levine, 2005). Nunn (2007) pointed out that better con-
tract enforcement makes countries more specialized in the industries in which so-called
relationship-specific investments play a dominant role.
Improvement of institutional quality helps the development of many non-resource
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sectors more than it helps the development of resource sectors, so that better institu-
tions make resources become less important. The correlation between the economy and
non-resource sectors is thus stronger than correlation between the economy and resource
abundance, and indeed we observe a decreasing and insignificant effect of resource abun-
dance when institutional quality increases.
Figure 2.3: Marginal effect of other control variables on economic growth as a function
of institutional quality






































































































































To further strengthen this argument, we present the functional effects of some other
control variables, namely industrialization, foreign investment, private sector employ-
ment, and R&D. Figure 2.3 shows the effects of industrialization, private sector employ-
ment, and foreign investment on economic growth all tend to be stronger and more
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positive in regions with better institutional quality. Typical examples are Qinghai,
Guizhou, and Ningxia. These provinces all suffer from weak institutional quality, and
their economies therefore rely largely on resource abundance, while the non-resource
sectors are poorly developed. In contrast, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Tianjing
provinces are among the top ten provinces in terms of institutional quality, and their
non-resource sectors, such as R&D, industrialization, and private sectors are among the
best. Resources in these provinces play only a small role in promoting economic growth.
When institutional quality exceeds the median level (62 on the left, 68 on the right
in Figure 2.2), the positive impact of resource abundance on economic growth increases
(but remains insignificant) as institutional quality improves. Apparently, provinces with
strong institutional quality and abundant natural resources are likely to make good use
of these resources and revenues. Property rights on natural resources in China are owned
by the government, and local residents therefore typically do not benefit much from rev-
enues derived from resource extraction. Most income associated with resources goes to
the government and to state-owned enterprizes. Hence, for provinces with weak insti-
tutional quality, rising revenues from the booming resource sectors are not used by the
government to stimulate the economy, but often harm economic development, because
they lead to increased prices for nontradable goods, thus lowering the competitiveness of
local economies (Zhang et al., 2008). If institutional quality is strong, however, then rev-
enues from resources may be used to boost economic development. This is because better
property rights tend to improve asset allocation, leading to higher growth (Claessens and
Laeven, 2003). Examples include Shandong, Jilin, Liaoning, Tianjin, and Henan pro-
vinces, most of which are traditional industrial provinces in North-East China. These
provinces are rich in natural resources (especially mineral resources), the institutional
quality is high, and the exploitation and use of the resources is efficient. Booms in re-
source sectors thus do not impede the development of non-resource sectors, but instead
stimulate industries that are indirectly related to resources such as the automobile, ship-
building, and equipment manufacturing industries.
Our results are very robust to different measures of resource revenues and to different
weights for institutional quality. Even when we take into account the possible influence
of the 2000 policy shock and estimate the model with separate samples (before and after
the shock), the results remain essentially unchanged. (Further details on the shock and
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its effects will be discussed in the next section.) We conclude that the effect of resources
on the economy is highly and nonlinearly dependent on institutional quality, and that
the correlation between resource abundance and economic growth is high and positive in
provinces with weak institutional quality, but weakly negative in provinces with medium
institutional quality.
2.5. A panel-data approach with time-varying resource effects
Cross-section models are useful in capturing long-run effects, but they do not identify
resource effect fluctuations over time. In particular, they cannot identify the effects
of a policy shock such as the West China Development Drive. This significant policy
package was introduced by the Chinese central government in 2000 with the purpose of
stimulating the economy of the Western regions. While the policy also involves non-
resource projects (such as promoting infrastructure construction, protecting the ecology
environment, and re-adjusting industrial structure), the emphasis is on intensifying nat-
ural resource exploitation. Several significant projects connected with natural resources
in West-China have resulted from this initiative. For example, the West-East natural gas
transmission project led to an increase of natural gas production in Sichuan and Qinghai
provinces by more than 100% and 900%, respectively, between 2000 and 2007. Also,
steel production in Yunan and Guizhou provinces increased by around 200% and 400%,
respectively, since the Drive began. The economic growth rate in Western provinces has
indeed increased since 2000. It is therefore to be expected that the relationship between
resources and growth is different before and after the policy, and we shall test this hy-
pothesis using both a standard and a time-varying coefficient panel-data approach. The
availability of panel data is important because, by allowing not only variation over pro-
vinces but also over time, we are able to capture the short-run dynamic behavior of the
resource effect as well as other impacts on economic growth. In addition, the use of panel
data enlarges the sample size and hence improves the accuracy of the estimates. Since
the stock measure of resource abundance is a historical variable that does not vary over
time, we can only use the flow measure (resource reserves) in the panel-data analysis.
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2.5.1. Standard panel-data approach
We first consider the standard panel-data model. To incorporate the policy shock in
2000, we introduce a policy shock dummy PD taking the value 0 before 2000 and 1 from
2000 onwards. Thus we have





where i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T , and we allow for the possibility of an interaction
term RAf × PD. Here Git denotes the growth rate of real GDP per capita in province i
at year t, ci is a province-specific effect, and PD and RAf ×PD capture the policy effect.
The auxiliary control variables in this case are
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idiosyncratic error ǫit is assumed to be independent of xit. Since province-specific effects
are correlated with the regressors, we employ a fixed-effect estimation method. The time-
invariant variables INS, INI, and WEST are excluded as explanatory variables, because
they cannot be identified in a fixed-effect method. Since our measure of institutional
quality varies only slightly in our observed time period (see Section 2.3), the exclusion
of INS will only have a slight effect on the results. We only use resource revenues (the
flow) as a measure of resource abundance, because our measure of resource reserves (the
stock) does not vary over time.
Table 2.3 presents the standard fixed-effect estimation results. Column (a) is the
benchmark, including only resource revenues and auxiliary control variables. The as-
sociation between resource revenues and growth is positive and strong in the short-run
dynamics, contrasting sharply with the insignificant long-run relationship. This discrep-
ancy between short-run and long-run effect is in line with Collier and Goderis (2008)
who find similar differences in a cross-country framework. One explanation of this pos-
itive association is the income effect that the ‘windfall gain’ from resources stimulates
consumption and further prompts economic growth. As expected, R&D and foreign in-
vestment have different short-run and long-run effects; these are long-run investments
having little effect in the short run. To study whether the 2000 policy shock affects eco-
nomic growth, column (b) includes the policy shock dummy PD. Its coefficient is strongly
significant, showing, as expected, that the new policy has led to higher growth. If we
include both PD and the interaction term RAf×PD, then we obtain column (c). The
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Table 2.3: Economic growth: standard panel-data model
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
RAf 0.0187 0.0132 0.0072 0.0128 0.0107
(5.51) (4.16) (2.16) (4.38) (4.94)
R&D −0.9825 −0.9486 −0.8366 −0.8938 −0.9166
(−3.80) (−4.83) (−3.42) (−3.72) (−3.91)
IND 0.0854 0.0734 0.0635 0.1039 0.1063
(5.66) (5.00) (3.86) (8.14) (8.18)
PSE 0.0283 0.0170 0.0305 0.0179 0.0293
(0.57) (0.33) (0.81) (0.35) (0.67)
FI −0.0510 −0.0216 −0.0214 −0.0282 −0.0276









Constant −0.0050 −0.0004 0.0108 −0.0034 −0.0064
(−0.66) (−0.07) (1.40) (−0.54) (−0.11)
overall R2 0.1534 0.2163 0.2279 0.2468 0.2547
p-value of F -test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ρ 0.2772 0.2026 0.1948 0.2349 0.2432
Note: t-values are in parentheses. ρ is the fraction of variance due to the individual-specific effect.
The number of observations in each column is 308.
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interaction term is positive and weakly significant (p-value is 9.5%), suggesting the pos-
sibility that the resource effect is different before and after the policy shock. The result
is not conclusive however, because a standard panel-data model can only measure the
linear difference between before and after the shock, thus capturing the average change.
If the resource effect contains nonlinear dynamics, then these are not captured by the
standard panel-data model. This leads us to the time-varying coefficient model, where
possibly nonlinear resource effects can be investigated. This model and the resulting
columns (d) and (e) are discussed in the next subsection.
2.5.2. Time-varying coefficient approach
The standard fixed-effect approach reveals different resource effects before and after the
policy shock. This approach can not, however, describe how the resource effect changes
after the policy shock. We expect that the effects of other variables are also influenced
by the policy. This could lead to a strengthening of the effects, because the policy
also involves non-resource projects and these non-resource industries may grow faster
after 2000. But it could also lead to a weakening, because the emphasis on resource
exploitation strengthens the association between resources and economic growth, and
also because an over-emphasis on resources crowds out the non-resource sectors, leading
to a weaker correlation between non-resource sectors and growth.
We extend the standard panel-data model by allowing the coefficients to be time-
varying, and consider the time-varying coefficient model
Git = c(t) + x
′
itτ(t) + ǫit (i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T ),
where xit are the explanatory variables: RAf , R&D, IND, PSE, and FI, all in province
i at year t. The dummy PD is excluded because the policy effect can now be captured
by the model parameters which are smooth functions of t. The parameter vector τ(t) =
{τ1(t), τ2(t), . . . , τk(t)}
′ contains the coefficients for the k = 5 control variables. This is
a typical time-varying coefficient model for panel data (Hoover et al., 1998). Unlike the
standard panel-data model, no within-transformation or first-difference transformation
is needed when estimating the model, because no incidental parameter problem occurs
in this case.
To estimate c(t) and τ(t), we employ a method proposed by Hoover et al. (1998,
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Section 2.3), in particular the local constant fit based on a kernel function K(·) with
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is a diagonal T × T weight matrix. The bandwidth is selected following Hoover et al.
(1998, Section 2.4) by minimizing the average predictive squared error with ‘leave-one-
out’ cross-validation.
The kernel estimator (ĉ(t), τ̂(t)) thus takes the form of a generalized least-squares
estimator with weight matrix K∗(t). Rather than running a cross section for every time
period, the kernel estimator employs not only the information at time t but also the
neighboring information, and its smoothness depends on the choice of bandwidth. By
selecting an optimal bandwidth, we minimize the average predictive squared error, and
obtain estimators with appropriate smoothness. The kernel estimator has also attractive
asymptotic properties (Hoover et al., 1998), but whether these properties apply here is
somewhat dubious because of the small number of provinces.
Figure 2.4 shows the results using the entire sample (all provinces). All coefficients
vary over time. The coefficient of resource revenues is positive and increasing from
2000–2004, and decreasing from 2005–2007. The R&D effect is increasing from 1997–
2000, fluctuating a little during 2001–2005, and decreasing after 2005. The coefficients
of industrialization, private sector employment, and foreign investment are generally de-
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Figure 2.4: Time-varying coefficients: entire sample
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Note: The solid curve is the estimated coefficient of each regressor, and the two dashed curves represent
±1.96 jackknife standard error bands. The jackknife standard errors are computed by leaving out one
individual at a time from the sample.
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creasing from 1997–2004. The estimated time-varying estimates are generally in line with
the standard panel-data results (except R&D). In particular, the nonlinearly dynamic
resource effect explains the positive but weakly significant coefficient of the interaction
term RAf×PD (column (c) in Table 3). Since the resource effect first increases and then
decreases after the shock, the before-and-after difference is partially offset and thus not
strongly significant on average. But, in general, the resource effect did change after the
policy shock, and became considerably stronger immediately after 2000, implying that
the correlation between resource revenue and economic growth is stronger after than be-
fore 2000. This is not surprising because the emphasis of the West China Development
Drive was on exploiting the resources in the Western provinces more intensively and
efficiently. Income in these regions has increased, stimulating economic growth, but not
equally in all regions. The decreasing coefficients of the other variables suggest that the
negative impact of the policy on non-resource effects dominates the positive impact.
In the period 2003–2004 the impact of resource revenues was particularly strong, be
it with relatively large standard errors. To confirm this result in the standard fixed-
effect model we included a time dummy D0304 for 2003–2004, and an interaction term
RAf×D0304. Columns (d) and (e) in Table 2.3 show that D0304 is significantly positive,
confirming that the economic growth rate was particularly high in 2003–2004. The
interaction term RAf×D0304 is positive, though not very precise, suggesting that the
resource effect increased during the period. In contrast, industrialization, private sector
employment, and foreign investment effects experienced a drop in these two years.
Apparently the economic situation in China was different in 2003 and 2004 than in
other years, and growth determinants had different effects during this period. This is
indeed the case. The economic growth rate was particularly high in 2003 and 2004,
mainly due to a high demand for investment. The annual growth rates of fixed asset
investment in 2003 and 2004 were 27.7% and 26.6%, respectively. One reason for such
high investments was an increasing demand for housing and automobiles. This demand
directly stimulated the investment in the realty business and the automotive industry,
and also indirectly in related industries (e.g. steel, building materials, power sector). In
addition, several great projects in the Western provinces were initiated in this period:
the West-East natural gas transmission project, the West-East electricity transmission
project, and the Western coal mining project. These projects led to a large increase in
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resource production with an associated increase in income. These two reasons explain
the strong correlation between resource revenues and economic growth in the period
2003–2004, while the effects of other explanatory variables are relatively weak.
To avoid overcapacity in the future, the government proposed policies to restrain
investment. As a result, fixed asset investment largely decreased in 2005 and 2006, and
economic growth slowed down. However, resource exploitation did not slow down, and
resource revenues kept on increasing, especially in the Western provinces. This is why
we observe a decreasing correlation between resource revenues and economic growth rate
after 2004.
To understand this from another viewpoint, we plot annual economic growth and
its determinants in Figure 2.5. All variables are averaged over Eastern and Western
provinces, respectively, and scaled to facilitate comparison. We observe a positive jump
in the growth rate in 2004, especially in the Western provinces, and a return to a lower
level in 2005. We also observe a jump in resource revenues in both Eastern and Western
provinces in 2004. The co-movement of economic growth and resource revenues provides
further evidence of the strong correlation between resource revenues and economic growth
in 2003–2004. When the economic growth rate returned to a lower level after 2004,
resource revenues in the Western provinces were still increasing at a high speed from 2006
to 2008. This explains the decreasing correlation between economic growth and resource
revenues after 2004.
The decreasing correlation between economic growth and resource revenues after 2004
shows that increased resource exploitation did not promote the development of other in-
dustries and sectors typically regarded as engines of economic growth. As exemplified
in Figure 2.5, average R&D, industrialization, private sector employment, and foreign
investment all changed relatively little as resource revenues increased sharply. Typical
examples are Ningxia and Gansu provinces, where resource revenues increased signifi-
cantly after 2000, but most of the other sectors were still underdeveloped. The economies
of the Western provinces still relied much on primitive sectors, and the industrial struc-
ture of the Western provinces failed to modernize. The emphasis on resource exploitation
brought extra income in the short run, but it did not narrow the gap between West and
East China. In addition, only part of the resources produced by the Western regions
was used to improve the local economy. The larger part was transported to the Eastern
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Figure 2.5: Time series plot of growth and its determinants
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regions to meet the large demand for energy and resources there. For example, the most
important gas field in Sichuan province transmitted more than 70% of its natural gas to
Eastern provinces. This may also have resulted in enlarging the gap between Eastern
and Western provinces. In summary, the intensification of resource exploitation in the
Western provinces helped the local economy to some extent, but the positive effect was
short-run and not long-run.
2.6. Conclusions
In this paper we have re-examined the effect of natural resource abundance on economic
growth at the provincial level in China. We emphasize four features of our analysis. First,
we employ new data on natural resource abundance and institutional quality to study
the association between resource abundance, institutional quality, and economic growth.
We compare two types of resource abundance measures: a stock measure and a flow
measure. The new measures of resource abundance are considered to be more exogenous
than the conventional resource dependence measure. Institutional quality is measured
by a subjective measure of confidence in courts, and it is shown to be theoretically and
empirically related to resource abundance and economic growth.
Second, we model a nonlinear resource effect on economic growth. Classical growth
regressions cannot fully capture the resource effect on economic growth in China because
the resource effect is (nonlinearly) dependent on institutional quality. Thus we employ
a functional-coefficient model and we find that the effect of resources on the economy is
a nonlinear function of institutional quality, and that the correlation between resource
abundance and economic growth is strong and positive in provinces with weak institu-
tional quality, but relatively weak in provinces with strong institutional quality. This
finding partially supports the argument in Mehlum et al. (2006) that the resource ef-
fect depends on institutional quality, but it suggests that such dependence may not be
captured satisfactorily by the linear model considered by them. More importantly, the
conclusion that worse institutions make the effect of natural resources more positive
(rather than more negative) in China also contrasts with the cross-country evidence in
Mehlum et al. (2006).
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Third, we study the different roles of resources on economic growth before and after
the 2000 policy shock, and find that the association between resources and economic
growth is not constant over time if we consider short-run dynamics. Immediately after
the 2000 policy shock, the positive correlation between economic growth and resource
revenues was increasing, but this did not last long. After 2004 economic growth slowed
down while resource revenues kept increasing, leading to weak correlation.
Finally, we analyze the resource effect using both cross-section and panel data. The
cross-section model typically captures the long-run effect, and the panel-data model the
short-run effect. Abundant resource revenues are positively correlated with economic
growth in the short-run, and their long-run correlation is positive in provinces with weak
institutional quality.
Although our paper is a cross-province study in China, some ideas can be applied to
more general cross-country studies. Our paper suggests that the classical growth model is
not always satisfactory in studying resource effects, because it fails to capture a possibly
nonlinear influence of institutional quality. It is likely that institutional quality is also
relevant in other countries. This is also the case with our finding that the resource effects
in China change over time. This is likely to be true in other countries. For example,
evidence before World War II tends to support a positive effect of resources on growth
(Habakkuk, 1962), while most empirical studies using data after World War II report a
negative effect.
Further research is still needed in at least three directions. First, economic growth
just measures one aspect of economic development. Economic development also includes
inter alia a decrease in poverty and infant mortality, and better nutrition (Bulte et al.,
2005). In many countries with high growth rates there is poverty and basic nutritional
needs are not met. Therefore, the effect of natural resources on economic growth is not
necessarily the same as the effect of natural resources on economic development (Zhang
et al., 2008). Second, the exogeneity of resource abundance deserves more investigation,
and the quality of resource abundance measures may be further improved by using stock
values of earlier years. Third, while a more general institutional indicator has been used
in cross-country studies, there are no systematic indicators on institutional quality in
China. Since institutional quality appears a key variable, more accurate measures would




Causes and consequences of the
flat income tax2
3.1. Introduction
The last decade has witnessed a widespread interest in the “flat income tax”, which is
defined as an income tax system in which a single marginal tax rate is levied on labor
income. Apart from four early flat tax adopters,3 the first flat tax system was introduced
in Estonia in 1994, followed by Lithuania in that same year, and Latvia in 1995. A second
wave of flat tax reforms—primarily involving former Eastern European countries4—was
initiated by the remarkable revenue performance of the Russian personal income tax
reform of 2001. A year after the introduction of a single marginal rate of 13 percent,
Russian personal income tax (PIT) revenues increased by about 26 percent (Ivanova
et al., 2005) via an increase in employment or a reduction in tax evasion (Gorodnichenko
et al., 2009) or both. Apart from the transition countries, flat tax reforms also spread
to other parts of the world (e.g., Trinidad and Tobago, Mongolia, Mauritius, and so
on). As of 2011, there have been 28 flat tax adopters. And this is not the end yet.
More recently, in several industrialized countries the flat income tax has been discussed
in academic and policy circles, such as Denmark and the Netherlands. In particular,
President Obama of the United States revived the discussion about the flat tax during
his speech at Cayuhoga Community College in Parma, Ohio, on September 8, 2010.5
2This chapter is coauthored with the late Jenny Ligthart.
3Jersey, Hong Kong, Guernsey, and Jamaica introduced flat taxes in the 1940s and 1950s.
4In chronological order these countries are: Serbia, Slovak Republic, Ukraine, Georgia, Romania,
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kazakhstan, Bulgaria, Czech Re-
public, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Belarus.
5In his speech, he suggested to: “Apply the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) to all [personal income
tax] filers at a 19 percent rate. At the same time broaden the tax base by eliminating all deductions,
exemptions, and credits except for a personal allowance...Integrate the corporate income tax with the
personal income tax at the same 19 percent rate. Eliminate double taxation of dividends, tax on capital
gains, tax on estates, and deduction of interest.”
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Although the introduction of flat income taxes has been widely recognized as an
important development in tax polices, little attention has been paid to the question of
what drives countries to adopt a flat income tax.6 In fact, no studies have addressed this
question yet. Therefore, this paper takes a first cut on unraveling the determinants of
flat tax adoption. Do economic and institutional factors play a role or is it just because
countries’ neighbors have already adopted flat income taxes? The second question ad-
dressed in the paper is whether flat tax adoption has raised countries’ tax revenue. The
literature on the economic consequences of the flat tax is primarily informal in nature
and extremely sparse.7 Most studies pertain to individual country experiences. Using
Russian household-level data, Ivanova et al. (2005) and Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) an-
alyzes the impact of flat tax introduction on tax compliance and labor supply responses.
Fuest et al. (2007) employ a simulation analysis to study the equity and efficiency ef-
fects of a revenue-neutral flat rate tax reform in Germany. Finally, Dı́az-Giménez and
Pijoan-Mas (2011) employ a calibrated general equilibrium model for the United States
to study the welfare and distributional consequences of various types of flat taxes. The
current paper contributes to the literature by being the first cross-country study on the
revenue effects of flat income tax adoption.
To investigate the causes and consequences of flat taxes, we employ a unique panel
dataset of 75 industrialized and developing countries during the 1990–2011 period. We
estimate two equations—an adoption equation and revenue equation. Building on the
existing flat tax literature, we consider various economic factors (e.g., the level of devel-
opment, the composition of GDP, and openness), the share of neighbors in the region
adopting a flat tax, institutional quality, participation in lending programs by the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, and party orientation. The revenue equation studies the
impact of the presence of the flat tax on the tax revenue-to-GDP ratio. This equation
controls for variables from the tax-effort literature and interacts the flat tax adoption
dummy with various economic variables.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on flat taxes in terms of econometric
estimation methods. Since only four countries have ever repealed the flat income tax,8
we estimate the adoption equation using Cox’s proportional hazard model. This model
6We focus on the date of flat tax implementation.
7See Hadler et al. (2007) and Keen et al. (2008) for an overview and a description of country cases.
8Four are Iraq (2006), Iceland (2010), Serbia (2010), and Ukraine(2011).
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improves estimation in Keen and Lockwood (2010), who estimated the determinants of
value-added tax (VAT) adoption employing a dynamic probit model. The revenue equa-
tion is estimated by the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach (Arellano and
Bond, 1991) because we include a one-period time lag of the dependent variable and have
a much larger number of cross-sectional units than time periods. This approach allows
using internal instruments to address the potential endogeneity of flat-tax adoption; that
is, the revenue needs of a country may induce it to adopt a flat tax. Because lagged levels
of variables are likely to be weak instruments for first-differenced dependent variables,
we employ an system GMM approach (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
The results for the proportional hazard model show that countries with lower institu-
tional quality, right-leaning social preferences, and more neighbors (defined as countries
in the region) having already adopted a flat income tax are more likely to adopt a flat
tax. We also find evidence for a role of the IMF in support of the spread of flat taxes.
Flat tax adoption has a significant and positive effect on the tax revenue-to-GDP ratio,
particularly if countries feature a small agricultural sector, do not have a high income
per capita, and higher institutional quality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 defines flat income taxes, discusses
cross-country experiences, and presents various hypotheses on the determinants of flat
income tax introduction. Section 3.3 sets out the empirical methodology and describes
data and variables. Section 4.4 presents the results. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes.
3.2. The flat tax
This section defines flat income taxes, discusses cross-country experiences, and presents
the key hypotheses on the determinants of flat income tax adoption.
3.2.1. What is a flat tax?
Hall and Rabushka (1985) are the first authors to strongly support a flat income tax,
which refers to a tax structure in which the same, single tax rate is levied on both business
income and individual employment income. However, when the term “flat income tax”
is used nowadays, people do not have the Hall and Rabushka (HR) flat income tax in
mind. In recent years, a much more loose definition—with a focus on labor income—has
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been adopted by policy makers and academics. Although flat taxes vary greatly, Keen
et al. (2008) point out that the sole common feature of a flat income tax is a single,
strictly positive marginal tax rate on labor income. More formally, Keen et al. (2008)
define a flat income tax as follows:
TF (Y ) = max[t · (Y − AF ), 0], (3.1)
where TF (·) represents the labor income tax liability, Y denotes labor income, t rep-
resents the single positive marginal labor income tax rate, and AF denotes an income
tax allowance. While in practice the single tax rate t is also applied to other kinds of
income—or in some cases even consumption—we define the flat tax in line with Keen et
al. (2008).
One point deserves our attention. The definition of the flat tax in Equation (3.1)
only takes into account the personal income tax. In practice, the effective tax on labor
income also depends on the system of social insurance contributions.Thus, even if the
tax authorities adopt a flat tax in the sense of Equation (3.1), the effective labor tax
schedule is far from flat. This concern is strengthened by the policy choices of recent
adopters, where the flat tax introduction was accompanied by a reform of social security
contributions with a view to raise more public revenues. Therefore, the effective rate
of tax on labor income may be quite high, even in presence of a low flat income tax
rate. However, for simplicity, the econometric analysis abstracts from social security
contribution issues.
3.2.2. Experiences with the flat tax
Apart from four early adopters—i.e., Jersey (1940), Hong Kong (1947), Guernsey (1960),
and Jamaica (1986)—the flat tax reform was initiated by Estonia in 1994, which was
followed by Lithuania in 1994 and Latvia in 1995. These reforms had not provoked much
controversy and spurred continuing interest until 2001, when Russia implemented a flat
tax reform as one critical part of a bigger tax reform package. The Russian reform did
not only consist of the replacement of the three rate personal income tax (PIT) structure
to one rate, but also a sharp reduction in the highest marginal rate. It prompted a new
wave of flat tax reforms—which we label the second wave—that still continues.
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Table 3.1 shows that 28 jurisdictions9 adopted a flat income tax as of December
2011 of which four countries (i.e., Iceland, Iraq, Serbia, and Ukraine) have abolished it
already.10 Most of the flat tax countries are situated in the Eastern European region.
Among the flat tax countries, we observe downward trends of the number of tax brackets
and the top statutory PIT rates. On average, before flat tax reforms, the flat tax countries
had 3.6 rates, a top PIT rate of 28.4 percent, and an average rate of 20 percent. After
the flat tax introduction the average rate came down to 16.3 percent. Replacing multiple
tax brackets with a flat income tax rate would reduce administrative and information
costs and may discourage people from manipulating taxable income to move down the
scale. Besides, increased international mobility has increased tax competition and put
a downward pressure on tax rates. The top PIT rate has occasionally been used in
empirical cross-country research as a proxy variable for tax progressivity or as a way
of assessing the overall excess tax burden (Johnson et al. 1998, Friedman et al. 2000).
Setting the personal income tax rate at a lower level may decrease the average rate,
leading to an improvement in Pareto efficiency (Keen et al., 2008) and increases in labor
supply (Duncan and Peter, 2009).
9Because of data unavailability, we do not report Grenada and Timor Leste, which adopted a flat
income tax system in 1994 and 2008, respectively.
10The Serbia parliament approved amendments to the Personal Income Tax Law in 2010, stating that
income up to six times the average annual salary is subject to a 10% tax and income exceeding this
amount is subject to a 15% tax. Iceland replaced its flat-rate personal income tax with three national
rates since January 1, 2010, due to its financial and economic crisis. Deficit worries forced Ukraine to
introduced a new 17% personal income tax rate (in addition to its main personal income rate at 15%) for
individuals whose monthly income exceeds ten times the monthly minimum wage on January 1, 2011.


























Table 3.1: Flat Tax Adopters: 1994–2011
Country/Jurisdiction Adoptiona Type of PIT rates before reform PIT rates after reform
year Reformb Number Average Top rate Rate at introduction Rate as of 2011
of rates (in percent) (in percent) (in percent) (in percent)
Estonia 1994 1 3 24.3 33.0 26.0 21.0
Lithuania 1994 0 5 22.6 33.0 33.0 15.0
Latvia 1995 1 2 17.5 25.0 25.0 25.0
Russia 2001 0 3 20.7 30.0 13.0 13.0
Serbia 2003 1 3 15.0 20.0 14.0 12.5c
Iraq 2004 1 11 39.1 75.0 15.0 8.3c
Slovak Republic 2004 2 5 25.6 38.0 19.0 19.0
Ukraine 2004 0 5 23.0 40.0 13.0 16.0c
Turkmenistan 2004 0 7 15.1 25.0 10.0 10.0
Georgia 2005 0 4 14.7 20.0 12.0 20.0
Romania 2005 1 5 28.6 40.0 16.0 16.0
Kyrgyz Republic 2006 1 2 15.0 20.0 10.0 10.0
Trinidad and Tobago 2006 1 2 27.5 30.0 25.0 25.0
Iceland 2007 0 2 38.7 39.7 35.7 26.8c
Kazakhstan 2007 0 6 20.0 40.0 10.0 10.0
Macedonia 2007 1 3 19.0 24.0 12.0 10.0
Mongolia 2007 0 3 20.0 30.0 10.0 10.0
Montenegro 2007 0 3 20.0 24.0 15.0 9.0
Mauritius 2007 1 2 18.8 22.5 15.0 15.0
Albania 2008 1 5 17.0 30.0 10.0 10.0
Bulgaria 2008 1 3 22.0 24.0 10.0 10.0
Czech Republic 2008 0 4 18.7 32.0 15.0 15.0
Belarus 2009 0 5 19.8 30.0 12.0 12.0
Belize 2009 1 5 35.0 45.0 25.0 25.0
Federation of Bosnia 2009 1 2 12.5 15.0 10.0 10.0
Paraguay 2010 0 0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0
Seychelles 2010 1 0 0.0 0.0 18.8 15.0
Hungary 2011 0 2 24.5 32.0 16.0 16.0
Average 3.6 20.0 28.4 16.3 14.8
Notes: a 28 countries have adopted a flat income tax, of which four have abolished it already (i.e., Iceland, Iraq, Serbia, and
Ukraine). The early adopters (i.e., Jersey, Hong Kong, Guernsey, and Jamaica) are excluded from the list. b Score variable taking
on a value of zero if only the personal income tax (PIT) becomes flat, unity if both the personal income tax and corporate income
tax (CIT) are flattened, and two if PIT, CIT, and the value-added tax become flat. c The country has abolished the flat tax.
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Apart from levying a single positive marginal rate on labor income, flat tax adopters
also share some other common features during their tax reforms. First, PIT revenue
has been reduced in the wake of flat tax reform in most countries, except for Latvia,
Lithuania, and Russia. Second, adoption of the flat tax is usually associated with a
reduction in the corporate income tax (CIT) rate. Third, most of the countries during
the second wave of reforms cut social security contributions (such as Georgia, Russia,
and the Slovak Republic). Last but not least, adoption of the flat tax, especially during
the second wave of reforms, is usually accompanied by an increase in indirect taxation,
such as the VAT and excises, with a view to compensate for potential revenue losses.
Although these countries share similar features, some differences deserve attention.
Countries during the first wave of reforms levied a single, positive tax rate on labor
income at the level which is close to the highest pre-reform tax rates. In contrast, the
second wave of reforms was characterized by tax rates set close to the lowest level of
the marginal tax rate prior to reform. Another difference concerns the tax categories
covered by a flat rate. Table 3.1 shows that 13 of 28 jurisdictions introduced a flat PIT
only, and 15 of 28 introduced flat CIT and PIT systems. More interestingly, the Slovak
Republic is the only one that applied a single rate to personal income, corporate income,
and consumption. Finally, in many countries, although the adoption of the flat tax has
been accompanied by an increase in personal allowances, the basic level and degree of
increase strongly varies from country to country (see Table 3.2).
3.2.3. Causes of the flat income tax
So far, many flat tax reforms have occurred in former socialist countries, either former
Soviet Union members or former Yugoslavia. One possible mechanism to explain this
is the copycat effect. The term ‘copycat effect’ comes from criminology and originally
refers to the tendency of sensational publicity about violent murders or suicides to result
in more of the same through imitation. We borrow this concept to describe a country’s
imitation response to the behavior of its neighbors. In fact, it is not rare that such
imitation response is observed in countries’ decisions whether or not to adopt tax laws
or to join international treaties. Aidt and Jenen (2009), who analyze the determinants
of income tax adoption, have shown that countries are more likely to adopt this tax if a
larger share of neighboring countries has already done so. Alm et al. (1993) find evidence
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of a copy-cat effect in state lottery enactment in the United States using data for the
1964–1992 period. In a similar vein, Keen and Lockwood (2010) estimate the probability
of a country adopting a value-added tax (VAT) in response to the proportion of neigh-
bors in the region having implemented such a tax. In addition, Davies and Naughton
(2003) and Egger and Larch (2008) provide evidence of increased coalition formation
among proximate countries for the case of environmental treaties and preferential trade
agreements, respectively. Concerning the flat income tax adoption, Baturo and Grey
(2007) suggests that “the spread of the flat tax has reflected rational learning as coun-
tries observed and followed successful experiments elsewhere”. The regional nature of
the spread could be seen as indicative of a form of yardstick competition, as domestic
voters benchmark policy makers’ intentions by comparing with the policy of neighbors.
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Table 3.2: Personal Allowances in Flat Tax Adopters
country/jurisdiction Year of Allowance Measured in US dollars Change
implementation Before Tax Reform In 2011
Estonia 1994 181.51 2403.338 ++
Lithuania 1994 8.06 2163.96 ++
Latvia 1995 0.00 1017.956 NA
Russia 2001 112.62 158.0616 +
Serbia 2003 7,796.02 3149.947 -
Iraq 2004 0.00 NA
Slovak Republic 2004 1,054.04 4950.348 ++
Ukraine 2004 38.25 711.4739 ++
Turkmenistan 2004 0.00 1684.211 ++
Georgia 2005 56.35 0 eliminated
Romania 2005 735.37 944.0196 +
Kyrgyz Republic 2006 0.00 212.9854 ++
Trinidad and Tobago 2006 3,968.53 9411.014 ++
Iceland 2007 4,842.49 0 eliminated
Kazakhstan 2007 928.10 856.2994 -
Macedonia 2007 729.32 1888.593 ++
Mongolia 2007 2.00 0 eliminated
Montenegro 2007 0.00 0 BA
Mauritius 2007 6,780.61 8283.416 +
Albania 2008 0.00 1154.552 ++
Bulgaria 2008 1,679.44 0 eliminated
Czech Republic 2008 354.79 1237.81 ++
Belarus 2009 196.59 1772.698 ++
Belize 2009 0.00 12800 NA
Federation of BiH 2009 0.00 2558.635 NA
Notes: ++ indicates a substantial increase in personal allowances, + indicates an increase, −
means a decrease and “eliminated”means that basic personal allowances are eliminated in 2011.
Furthermore, Blumkin, Sadka, and Shem-Tov (2011) showed that such competition will
be intensified in a globalized world economy in which workers are more mobile. In the
presence of labor migration, a coordinated shift to a flat tax system proves to be beneficial
for neighboring countries as strategic competitors, especially when administration costs
are taken into account. Therefore, the first hypothesis to be tested empirically can be
formulated as follows:
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Hypothesis 1. Countries display copycat effect behavior: countries adopt a flat tax
because other countries in the same region have already done so.
Given the high degree of tax evasion in many flat tax countries, it is reasonable to
expect that a government’s motivation to improve tax compliance is the main driving
force for flat tax introduction.11 Intuitively, the flat tax system would simplify the tax
structure, thus making it easier to comply with the tax system. In addition, arbitrage
opportunities and tax administration costs will be reduced. This intuition finds its
theoretical basis in the limited academic literature on flat taxes. For instance, results in
Hindriks et al. (1999) suggest that a flat tax may in itself be conducive to compliance
as well as to the level and structure of tax rates. Besides, using Russian micro data,
Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) find large and significant reductions in tax evasion following
the flat tax reform via an increase in voluntary compliance. Since institutions are usually
weak in countries with low tax compliance, we can postulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Countries of lower institutional quality are more likely to adopt a flat
income tax.
Countries’ likelihood of adopting the flat income tax may also be affected by the
intervention of International Monetary Fund (IMF). There is a large empirical literature
on the impact of IMF lending on various macroeconomic outcomes (Barro and Lee,
2005 and Easterly, 2005). In particular, the IMF’s lending programs are effective in
promoting specific policy changes. For example, Keen and Lockwood (2010) show that
IMF interventions have actually contributed to the spread of VAT adoption through
program conditionality and technical assistance. Although no official documents have
included the adoption of a flat income tax in the set of reforms that a country commits
itself to implement under IMF lending, the impact of IMF on the flat income tax adoption
cannot be ignored. First, given the importance of social and macroeconomic implications,
flat income tax reforms will greatly affect the economic stability and growth, which is
center stage to the role of the IMF. Second, a great part of flat tax adopters are developing
countries, who are in great need of external financial assistance from institutions like
11For example, Ukraine introduced a flat income tax reform with the motivation to decrease the size
of the underground economy and reduce tax evasion. Besides, the Albanian government stated on June
6th, 2007, that its enactment of a 10 percent flat tax was intended to discourage illegal activities. In
a similar vain, on July 31th, 2007, Bulgaria Prime Minister Stanishev stated that the flat tax would
increase revenue by bringing income of tax evaders into the tax net.
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IMF. Therefore, these countries’ adoption decisions will be inevitably affected by IMF
intervention.
Hypothesis 3. The presence of an IMF program will increase the likelihood of a country
adopting a flat income tax.
Finally, a government’s social preference might as well provide a convincing expla-
nation for the adoption of the flat tax. A Rawlsian government likes to introduce a
very non-linear tax schedule with many tax brackets and income-dependent subsidies
or income support, thus realizing the goal of redistributing income from middle- and
high-income groups to the low-income group. A utilitarian government will do the op-
posite, improving the social welfare and decreasing administration costs at the cost of
benefits for the low-income group. Zoutman, Jacobs and Jongen (2012) show that the
flat tax is damaging social welfare especially with more left-leaning social preferences.
Since the Rawlsian government is in favor of a very non-linear tax scheme, it is much
more restricted than the utilitarian government to realize its objectives under a flat tax.
Hence, the welfare cost for a utilitarian government moving towards the flat tax scheme
is much less.
Hypothesis 4. Countries with right-leaning social preferences are more likely to adopt
a flat income tax.
3.2.4. Consequences of the flat income tax
The adoption of the flat income is likely to affect microeconomic indicators (e.g., working
incentives) as well as macroeconomic indicators (GDP growth, government revenue, and
equity). This paper only focuses on the revenue effect of flat income tax reform. Empir-
ical evidence on this relationship is mixed. The adoption of the flat tax was followed by
a reduction in PIT revenue in various countries, except in Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia.
Early adopters, Latvia and Lithuania both set their flat tax rates at the old top tax rate
prior to reform, which is different from the strategy of adopters after Russia’s reform
in 2001. For Russia, the flat tax reform has achieved unprecedented success in sharply
increasing PIT revenue (by 46 percent in nominal terms and by nearly 20 percent as
share of GDP) during the first year after the reform. However, Ivanova et al. (2005)
and Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) argue that the strong revenue performance could be
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attributed to the recovery of the economy or improved tax compliance, owing to either
changes in the parameters of the reform or the more strict enforcement of taxes, thus
the sharp increase is less related to the flat tax reform itself. Due to the mixed effect of
the flat income tax on the tax revenue, we do not propose any hypothesis related to the
consequence of the flat income tax.
3.3. Empirical specification
This section presents the adoption and revenue equations, describes the data, and dis-
cusses the covariates.
3.3.1. Adoption equation: duration analysis
Our paper models the adoption of flat income taxes in a hazard framework. In practice,
countries are unlikely to repeal the flat income tax once they have adopted it, because
repealing it will lead to large administration costs and create policy instability. The dis-
tribution of the time t until flat tax adoption is obviously asymmetric, autocorrelated,
and possibly bimodal. In such case, an ordinary least squares or probit model—by as-
suming the normality of the error terms—may lead to biased and inconsistent estimates
(Cleves et al., 2004). Therefore, the duration model is employed because it does not
impose any assumption on the distribution of the error term. Duration analysis concen-
trates on the hazard rate (or function); that is, the probability of flat tax adoption at
time t = 1, ..., T as a function of time and potentially time-varying independent variables
Xit. Let T
A be the time of flat tax adoption, then the hazard rate for country i = 1, ..., N
at time t is given by
hi(t, Xit) = lim
∆t→0
Pr(t+∆t > TA > t|TA > t,X(i, t))
∆t
. (3.2)
To investigate the association between the probability of flat tax adoption and the
independent variables, one needs to impose a functional form on the hazard rate h(t, Xit).
Here, we parameterize this model using a particularly popular semi-parametric propor-
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tional hazard specification (Cox, 1972),
hi(t, Xit) = h0(t) exp(β0 +X
′
i(t−a)β), (3.3)
where a is a suitable time lag (see below). The Cox model describes the hazard rate as
multiplicatively proportional to a baseline hazard h0 that only depends on time. Note
that the logarithm of the hazard rate is a linear function of the independent variables
and therefore the exponentiated individual coefficients β have the interpretation of the
ratio of the hazards for a one-unit change in the corresponding independent variable.
One nice feature of this model is that the baseline hazard h0(t) is given no particular
parametrization and is left unestimated. To estimate a parametric regression model
without a distributional assumption, the partial maximum likelihood method is used.
Because there is always a time lag between the decision to adopt a flat income tax and
the entering into effect of the tax law, we lag the full set of time-varying determinants
of flat income tax adoption by one year (i.e., a = 1).
Several technical issues are involved in estimating a Cox model. First, there is the
possibility of tied failures, that is, subjects fail (i.e., a flat tax reform takes place) at
the same time. Since Cox regression estimates are based on forming the risk set at
each failure time and then maximizing the conditional probability of failure, it is the
ordering of the failure rather than the times at which failures occur, that matters in a
Cox model. In our case, there are tied countries (adopt flat tax at the same year), and
this tie is particularly strong for closely neighbored countries. Such tied failures make
exact ordering of failure unclear. To address this issue, we use Breslow’s method which
is computationally simple. In this approximation method, the risk sets are the same for
all countries that adopt flat tax in some particular year. This approximation has high
accuracy when the number of tied failures in the risk group is small relative to the size
of risk group itself, as in our data set.
In our sample, we do not have left-censored observations, that is, countries adopting
a flat tax before the observed period 1990. However, we do have observations right-
censored, in other words, some countries do not adopt flat tax within our sample period.
Wooldridge (2001) showed that right-censoring does not bias the coefficients as long as
the time until flat tax adoption, conditional on Xit, is independent of the censoring time.
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This assumption is satisfied in our case, because the censoring time (i.e., the year 2011)
is a predetermined constant.
3.3.2. Revenue equation: system GMM approach
To investigate the impact of flat income tax on tax revenue, we consider the following
revenue equation
rit = αrrit−1 + βFFit + β
′




ZZit + µk + λt + εit, (3.4)
where rit is the logarithm of the ratio of tax revenue to Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
for country i at time t and εit is an error term. Fit is a dummy variable taking the value
unity if country i has adopted the flat income tax in year t and zero otherwise. Yit is a
vector of variables that are standard in the tax effort literature and institutional quality,
and they are always in the model. Zit is a vector of other auxiliary control variables
whose inclusion depends on the specification chosen. Control variables will be discussed
in detail in the next section. We expect a positive state dependence, namely 0 < αr < 1,
while the sign of βF is not clear. The parameters µk and λt represent regional dummies
and time fixed effects, respectively.
Several econometric issues may arise from estimating equation (3.4). First, variable
F is assumed to be endogenous. Second, time invariant country characteristics (fixed
effects), such as geography and demographics, may be correlated with the explanatory
variables. Third, the presence of the lagged dependent variable rit−1 gives rise to auto-
correlation. Finally, the panel dataset has a short time dimension (T = 22) and a larger
country dimension (N = 75).
To solve these issues, the Arellano-Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator is first
considered. The Arellano-Bond procedure is especially designed for panel data with













where ∆ denotes the first difference operator. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) built a set of
internal instruments, where missing observations are substituted by zeros and include all
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Thus, the moment conditions are
E[rit−l∆εit] = 0 for each t ≥ 3, t > l ≥ 2. (3.7)
By taking first differences, the country-specific fixed effect is removed. Endogeneity of
Fit can be solved by instrumenting it with its (second-order) lagged values, because this
endogenous variable is pre-determined and uncorrelated with the future error terms.
Using higher order lags does not affect our results.
Sometimes, the lagged levels of the regressors are poor instruments for the first-
differenced regressors. To avoid this, our paper uses its augmented version—the system
GMM estimator designed by Blundell and Bond (1998). The system GMM estimator
uses the level equation to obtain a system of two equations: one differenced and one in
levels.
One of the major advantages of system GMM over the difference approach is that it
improves estimation efficiency, but it uses more instruments than the difference GMM.
When the number of instruments is greater than the number of countries, the Hansen
test may be weak (Andersen and Sorensen, 1996; Bowsher, 2002).12 Roodman (2009a,
2009b) also shows that too many instruments will lead to several problems in finite
samples. In order to reduce the instrument count, we use collapsing instruments. The
collapsing technique combines instruments into smaller sets, which has the advantage of
retaining more information, while minimizing lag losses.
12The Hansen (1982) test tests the joint validity of instruments when the model is overidentified
(Hansen, 1982).
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3.3.3. Data and variables
The sample Our unbalanced panel data set covers 75 countries over the period 1990–
2011. The countries in our sample are divided in three categories. The first category
includes 28 countries that have joined the flat tax club. The second category covers
33 countries that are contemplating adopting a flat tax. A country is identified as a
contemplator if it is seriously considering a flat income tax based on public statements
made by key government officials. We used Alvin’s Rabushka’s blog13 and homepages of
ministries of finance to identify this group of countries. The third category—consisting
of 15 countries—serves as a control group. These countries have neither adopted the flat
tax nor are contemplating introducing one.
In line with Ebrill et al. (2001), the countries in our sample are divided into the
following regions: Asia-Pacific (AP), the Americas (AS ), Sub-Saharan Africa (AF ), the
EU27 (EU ), Central Europe and the former Soviet Union (CBRO), North Africa and
Middle East (NME ) and small islands (SI ). The wide distribution of our sample across
countries further highlights its representativeness (see Table 3.3), as 60 percent of the
countries included are from Europe, more than half of which belong to Central Europe
and the former Soviet Union roughly. Roughly 11 percent of the countries are from the
Americas, 5 percent from Sub-Saharan Africa, 4 percent from North Africa and Middle
East, 8 percent from Asian Pacific, and 11 percent from small islands.14 Appendix Tables
A.1–A.3 provide the country composition of the sample, the descriptive statistics, and
data definitions and sources.
13See http://flattaxes.blogspot.nl/









Table 3.3: Flat Tax Adopters and Contemplators by Region
Regiona European Americas Sub-Saharan Central Europe, Baltics, Asia and North Africa Small Total
Union Africa Russia and others Pacific and Middle East Islands
Acronym EU AS AF CBRO AP NME SI
Adoptersb 0 0 1 19 1 1 5 27
Contemplatorsc 11 7 3 5 3 2 2 33
Non-Adopters 6 1 0 4 2 1 1 15
Total 17 8 4 28 6 4 8 75
Percentage 23 11 5 37 8 4 11 100
Notes: a The countries are classified according to Ebrill et al. (2001), see Table A.2. AS denotes the Americas, AF represents
Sub-Saharan Africa, EU stands for European Union (i.e., the 15 old EU members plus Norway and Switzerland, CBRO denotes
Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, NME represents North Africa and Middle East, AP denotes Asia and Pacific, and
SI are Small Islands (jurisdictions with a population under 1 million). b Countries that have currently or once implemented a flat
income tax. c Countries are classified as contemplators based on: (i) Rabushka’s blog; and (ii) statements of ministries of finance.
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We choose the year 1990 as the starting year for two reasons. First, Estonia was
the first country to adopt a flat tax system in 1994. Starting several years ahead of
the occurrence of the first flat tax adoption will avoid left-censoring issues. In addition,
many countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe were formed
around 1990 and thus data for the pre-1990 period are not available.
The adoption equation At the heart of the empirical analysis for the adoption equa-
tion is the flat tax dummy Fit, which takes on a value of unity if a flat tax is adopted.
Not all flat tax systems are alike, however. They differ substantially along many po-
tentially important dimensions of design: in the definition of income, in the level of the
tax rate, in the extent of exemptions and tax credits, and in the level of the tax-exempt
threshold. Although the yes/no distinction made by the flat tax dummy fails to capture
these important distinctions across flat tax systems, it still captures the most essential
aspect of a flat tax system.
Independent variables in the adoption equation include four variables related to the
hypotheses of Section 3.2: the copycat effect, the institutional quality, the IMF pro-
gram dummy, and the party orientation. To capture the copycat effect, the proportion
of countries in the same region as country i that implemented a flat tax in period t
is included. This follows the same method used in Keen and Lockwood (2010). An
alternative method to measure the copycat effect is using a spatial model. Instead of
defining ‘neighbors’ by continents, a spatial model uses a weight matrix to specify the
neighbor. In this paper, most flat tax adopters are members from former Soviet Union or
former Yugoslavia in central and Eastern Europe, so that they are not only in the same
continent, but also close to each other geographically. Therefore, Keen and Lockwood’s
(2010) method and methods based on a spatial model are expected to be closely related.
In the adoption equation, we also take tax compliance into account. Tax compliance
is considered to affect the likelihood of adopting the flat tax system. In addition, the
tax revenue would increase as a result of improved voluntary compliance from taxpayers
(Gorodnichenko et al., 2009). However, there is no consensus on the measurement of tax
compliance. In the paper, we include the institutional quality as an indirect measurement
of tax compliance, since dysfunctional institutions would be conducive to tax evasion.
There is a positive relationship between tax compliance and institutional quality. The
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key indicator of institutional quality in use is derived from Kaufmann et al. (2009),
which measures institutional quality along six dimensions of governance; that is, voice
and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule
of law, and control of corruption.
Our hypotheses also reserve an important role for a government’s social preferences in
determining whether or not to adopt the flat income tax. A government social preferences
are dominantly affected by the orientation of incumbent parties. Database of Political
Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al., 2001) identifies the party orientation with respect to
economic policies. ‘Right’ is for parties that are defined as conservative, Christian demo-
cratic, or right-wing; ‘left’ is for parties that are defined as communist, socialist, social
democratic, or left-wing; ‘center’ is for parties that are defined as centrist or when party
position can best be described as centrist; ‘0’ is for all those cases which do not fit into
the above-mentioned category. The value of the party orientation equals to 1 for right
parties, 2 for center parties, and 3 for left parties.
We include an IMF dummy, which measures whether a country participates in an IMF
lending program in a particular year. The IMF provides various loan instruments that
are tailored to address the specific circumstances of its diverse membership. Our paper
mainly considers the Extended Credit Facility (ECF, formerly the Poverty Reduction
and Growth Facility) and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), and we also take stand-by
arrangements into consideration. 44 countries—most of which are developing countries—
in our sample have been involved in these lending programs in the past decades. Among
these countries, 24 countries have adopted the flat tax systems, which account for around
86 percent of the flat tax club.
In addition to the variables of interest discussed above, we also include variables taken
from the tax effort literature. This set of control variables consists of basic economic
indicators: the logarithm of GDP per capita, the share of agriculture in GDP, and
openness. The logarithm of GDP per capita captures the level of economic development
in a country. The GDP share of agriculture is used as a proxy for the size of the informal
sector. 15 Openness, measured as the sum of the GDP shares of imports and exports, is
15The GDP share of agriculture may not be the best measure for the size of informal sector. Schneider
(2012) estimated the size of the informal sector using a combination of the MIMIC procedure and
the currency demand method as well as survey methods. However, such estimates suffer from data
limitations and the estimation is time-invariant for each country, thus it cannot be used in a panel
data analysis. Besides, Peter (2009) used the electricity consumption method (ECM) of measuring the
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likely to have a positive effect on flat tax adoption. As discussed in Section 3.2.3, more
open countries will encourage more labor mobility, which leads to a coordinated shift
among countries as strategic competitors to a flat tax system.
Last but not least, to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the regional level, we
employ five regional dummies based on Ebrill et al.’s (2001) classification (Table 3.3).
In particular, we pay special attention to CBRO countries, since many flat tax reforms
have occurred in former socialist countries, either from Soviet Union members or former
Yugoslavia. These countries are mostly located in central and eastern Europe, which fall
into the CBRO category. In addition, we include time fixed effects to capture common
shocks across countries (e.g., world wide recessions).
The revenue equation For the revenue equation, the dependent variable, rit, repre-
sents country i’s ratio of tax revenue to GDP in year t expressed in natural logarithms.
We collected tax revenue at the consolidated general government level, but resorted
to consolidated central government data for cases where general government data were
lacking.
The revenue equation incorporates all the previously discussed independent variables
except the copycat effect. The revenue equation also includes the logarithm of popula-
tion, which measures the country size, and a Federation dummy. In addition to these, we
consider a variable for resource wealth, which is expected to boost government revenue—
see, for example, the Gulf states (Keen and Lockwood, 2010).16 In the absence of panel
data on aggregate resource wealth, we utilize the cross-section data of subsoil (oil and
mineral) resource wealth in 2000 (in US dollars per capita) reported by the World Bank
(2006). Although this variable fails to account for resource discovery and depletion within
the sample period, it proves to be the best source available at present. In line with Keen
and Lockwood (2010), we include demographic variables; that is, the proportions of the
population 14 years or younger and 65 years or over. These people need more support
shadow economy. The idea is that the difference between the growth rate of electricity consumption and
the growth rate of recorded output (official GDP) can be attributed to the growth rate in the shadow
economy. However, it is very difficult to find electricity consumption data for 75 countries, and therefore
we use the output share of the agricultural sector as a proxy.
16We do not consider resource wealth in the adoption equation, since no literature has identified
the resource effect on the flat tax adoption decision. However, a large volume of literature points out
the relationship between resource abundance and institutional quality [see Ji et al. (2013) for a brief
overview], which implies an indirect effect of resource wealth on the flat tax adoption decision. This
however is beyond the scope of our paper.
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from tax revenue because they are out of labor market. For example, Rodrik (1998) and
Persson and Tabellini (2003) found that the tax ratio is expected to be increasing in the
number of elderly.
In the system GMM approach, all the independent variables in the revenue equation
discussed above are divided into two categories. The first category includes endogenous
variables, which are instrumented with system GMM-style instruments, i.e. the variables
after the differenced transformation are instrumented by lagged values of the variables
in levels, and the variables in levels are instrumented with their own first differences.
The endogenous variables include lagged tax revenue and the flat tax dummy. Except
for these two variables, other independent variables fall into the second category of
exogenous variables, which are instrumented by themselves.
3.4. Results
3.4.1. Adoption equation
Table 3.4 present the estimates of baseline Cox proportional hazard model. The esti-
mated coefficient of Cox model should be interpreted differently from classical regressions.
The positive coefficient suggests that an increase in a regressor increases the hazard rate.
Column (1) only includes those variables that are standard in the tax effort literature. It
shows that GDP per capita and the agricultural share are significantly negative, whereas
openness is significantly positive. The increase in first two variables both decreases the
hazard of adopting a flat tax, and more openness increases the hazard rate. To provide
a quantitative interpretation, we note that one unit change in a regressor z keeping all
else equal leads to a new hazard rate
h(t) = exp(βz)h0(t), (3.8)
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard. Thus the parameter estimates represent the increase
in the expected log of the relative hazard for each one unit increase in the regressor,
holding other regressors constant. For interpretability, one can also compute hazard
ratios by exponentiating the parameter estimates. For example, we observe there is
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a 0.1097 unit decrease in the expected log of the relative hazard for each one percent
increase in output share of agriculture, holding others constant. Or equivalently, there






Table 3.4: Adoption Equation: Proportional Hazard Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lagged GDP per capita (logarithm) -2.5971*** -1.5397*** -1.4981*** -2.1022*** -2.9664*** -1.2333* -0.7394
(0.414) (0.451) (0.534) (0.427) (0.472) (0.653) (0.738)
Lagged output share of agriculture -0.1097*** -0.0800*** -0.0965*** -0.1053*** -0.1354*** -0.0913*** -0.0751***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) -0.022 (0.025) (0.026) (0.027)
Lagged openness 0.0068*** 0.0059*** 0.0063*** 0.0061*** 0.0088*** 0.0065*** 0.0057**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Lagged copycat effect 0.0413*** 0.0379***
(0.006) (0.008)
Lagged institutional quality -0.5034*** -0.1285 -0.0123
(0.159) (0.203) (0.222)
Lagged IMF dummy 0.7211*** 0.4135* 0.2956
(0.189) (0.217) (0.222)




Other regional dummies N N N N N N Y
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,376 1,376 963 1,376 1,238 889 889
Pseudo R square 0.0390 0.0825 0.0421 0.0500 0.0730 0.1160 0.1410
Log Likelihood -628.9 -600.4 -600.4 -621.7 -516.1 -469.0 -455.9
Notes : The dependent variable is the flat tax dummy taking on a value of unity if a flat tax is present and zero
otherwise. A proportional hazard model is considered. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.
59
Chapter 3: Causes and consequences of the flat income tax
Column (2) further includes the copycat effect, which shows that strategic interaction
exists in flat tax adoption. Based on the results of Column (2), we can see that one more
percent of countries in the same region already having adopted the flat income tax will
increase the probability of this country’s adoption by 0.0422(= exp(0.0413)−1). The ob-
served regional burst may be driven by some form of yardstick competition. Column (3)
considers institutional quality, and the results suggest that institutions negatively influ-
ence the likelihood of introducing flat income taxes, which justifies Hypothesis 2. Quan-
titatively, one unit increase in institutional quality decreases the adoption probability
by 0.3955(= | exp(−0.5034)− 1|). This is because given a lower quality of institutions,
the government cannot strictly enforce taxes, especially for rich people. Therefore, tax
evasion will be more widespread in these countries. As flat income taxes prove to be
effective in reducing the tax evasion especially for the higher end of the income distribu-
tion, a government with lower quality of institutions may want to resort to flat income
taxes to improve tax compliance. Columns (4) considers whether an IMF dummy would
increase the hazard rate of flat tax adoption. Estimation results show that the effect of
participation in IMF lending programs is significant. According to Column (4), a country
under an IMF lending arrangement is 2.0566(= exp(0.7211)) times more likely to adopt
the flat tax than a country that is not under an IMF arrangement. Column (5) estimates
the baseline specification with the party orientation. The significant and negative effect
of the party orientation on the hazard rate of flat tax adoption suggests that if a govern-
ment is more Rawlsian with left-leaning social preferences, the move towards the flat tax
system is more difficult. In Column (6), we include the full panel of variables. We find
significance in all variables except for the institutional quality. Besides, the logarithm of
GDP per capita and the IMF dummy become modestly significant. In Column (7), we
further control for regional dummies. The logarithm of GDP per capita and the IMF
dummy lose their significance, but we still find significant and negative effects of output
share of agriculture and the party orientation. Openness continues to positively affect
the hazard rate of flat tax adoption, but the effect becomes less significant comparing
with the estimation results in previous columns. The copycat effect is excluded in this
column because the regional dummies and copycat effect are both capturing a geographic
effect on a country’s decision of flat tax adoption. In particular, many flat tax reforms
occurred in CBRO countries, thus the copycat effect and the CBRO regional dummy are
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highly correlated with each other. Including them simultaneously will cause the estima-
tion results unprecise. We find that the chance for a CBRO country to adopt the flat tax
system is 14.8946(= exp(2.7010)) higher than those countries coming from other regions.
Besides the copycat effect mechanism, the spread of the flat income tax among CBRO
countries can also be explained by the view of political economics. For those countries
in the “flat tax club” that are in transition from a largely planned economy to a market
economy, the implementation of the flat tax is usually followed by a fundamental change
in government, such as the formation of a markedly pro-liberalization government in
Estonia in 1992, the election of Vladimir Putin in 2000, the 2003 Rose Revolution in
Georgia and the 2004 coalition government in Romania (Keen et al., 2008). Therefore,
these countries could take advantage of a low flat tax rate to signal a fundamental regime
change toward a more market-oriented economy.
3.4.2. Revenue equation
Table 3.5 presents estimation results for the revenue equation using the system GMM
approach. As discussed in Section 3.3.3, the lagged dependent variable(i.e. the log
revenue-to-GDP ratio in the previous year) and the flat tax dummy are considered to
be endogenous and instrumented with system GMM-style instruments, and all the other
variables are instrumented by themselves. To solve the problem of too many instruments,
we cap the lag length of the instruments to the second lag. 17 Besides, we also use the
collapsing technique that combines instruments into smaller sets.
To provide a simple benchmark, Column (1) estimates a basic tax effort equation
including a lagged dependent variable (i.e., the log revenue-to-GDP ratio in the previous
year), a flat tax dummy, a federation dummy, and time dummies. The lagged dependent
variable is significantly positive, which suggests the existence of strong state dependence.
Our interest here focuses on the role played by the flat tax dummy, but it is not significant
in the baseline model. The insignificant effect of the flat tax dummy on tax revenue may
be explained from two aspects. First, the relationship between the flat tax adoption
and tax revenue is controversial. On the one hand, lowering the top personal income
tax (PIT) rate and increasing personal allowances will decrease tax revenue; on the
other hand, the flat tax system may improve tax compliance, since rich people are more
17The second lag is not correlated with the current error term, while the first is. We also experiment
with deeper lags, but using deeper lags reduces sample size.
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willing to pay their taxes in the presence of a lower tax burden. The flat income tax
would thus broaden the tax base, and if the tax base is large enough, the increase in
the tax base would offset the negative revenue effect of reduced tax rates in the upper-
income brackets and of increased personal allowances. Second, flat tax reforms usually
belong to a package of tax reforms. Not only the personal income tax, but also the
corporate income tax and value-added tax will change simultaneously. In particular, the
government usually increased indirect taxes (such as value-added taxes) to offset the
possible decrease resulting from flat income taxes. Therefore, the change in tax revenue
is not only attributed to flat income tax reforms; it is not so obvious how the flat income
tax reforms will eventually affect tax revenue. Among the group of variables standard
in tax-effort literature, only the logarithm of GDP per capita matters. The logarithm of
GDP per capita has a positive effect on revenue, which is intuitive, as a more wealthy
country can collect more tax revenue.
In Columns (2), we add further a group of control variables, including institutional
quality, the IMF dummy, the party orientation, the size and composition of population,
and resource wealth. After controlling for this group of variables, the significant and
positive effect of the lagged dependent variable is unaffected, but the logarithm of GDP
per capita becomes insignificant. The flat tax dummy continues to be insignificant. None
of the control variables are significant in affecting the tax revenue except for resource
wealth. We find the resource effect on tax revenue is modestly significant and positive.
The effect may be due to the fact that the rents generated by energy and mineral re-
sources are largely captured by the governments via taxes. In Columns (3) and (4), we
add interaction terms that enable the impact of the flat tax to be more than a simple shift
of intercept, potentially varying across countries according to their income levels, open-
ness, reliance on agriculture, and institutional quality. Column (3) interacts the flat tax
dummy with the logarithm of GDP per capita, output share of agriculture, openness, and
institutional quality, and adds these four interaction terms to the baseline specification
in Column (1). In Column (4), besides variables in the baseline model and interaction
terms, we further control for the same group of explanatory variables as in Column (2).
Several points deserve our attention. First, the effect of the flat tax dummy becomes
significantly positive after including interaction terms in Column (3) and Column (4).
Second, for the interaction effects involving the flat tax dummy, we find significantly
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Table 3.5: Revenue Equation: System GMM Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged tax revenue (logarithm) 0.7234*** 0.8154*** 0.5447*** 0.6852***
(0.117) (0.146) (0.199) (0.173)
GDP per capita (logarithm) 0.1349** 0.0411 0.2737** 0.1269
(0.059) (0.055) (0.120) (0.078)
Output share of agriculture 0.0015 0.0009 0.0052** 0.0033*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Openness 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Flat tax 0.0005 -0.0008 0.7279*** 0.5022**
(0.017) (0.015) (0.250) (0.205)
Federation Dummy -0.0045 0.0060 -0.0110 0.0041
(0.011) (0.008) (0.018) (0.011)
GDP per capita (logarithm) × Flat tax -0.6012*** -0.4178**
(0.186) (0.166)
Output share of agriculture × Flat tax -0.0141* -0.0092*
(0.007) (0.005)
Openness × Flat tax -0.0004 -0.0003
(0.001) (0.001)
Federation Dummy × Flat tax 0.1343 0.1050
(0.095) (0.071)
Institutional quality × Flat tax 0.1162** 0.0805*
(0.054) (0.041)
Institutional quality 0.0079 0.0084
(0.008) (0.011)
IMF dummy -0.0059 -0.0144
(0.007) (0.011)
party orientation 0.0032 0.0056**
(0.002) (0.003)
Population (logarithm) -0.0067 -0.0083
(0.007) (0.012)
Population share below age 14 0.0004 0.0008
(0.001) (0.002)




Constant 0.2185** 0.1424 0.3049** 0.1965
(0.106) (0.111) (0.150) (0.139)
Time dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 932 701 729 701
Number of jurisdictions 64 60 63 60
P-value AR(1) 0.0460 0.00442 0.0310 0.00652
P-value AR(2) 0.957 0.770 0.277 0.521
No. of Instruments 57 59 59 64
Sargan Test 20.90 44.46 43.92 45.33
Df.Sargan Test 31 30 31 30
P-value Sargan Test 0.914 0.0433 0.0620 0.0359
Hansen Test 29.78 27.27 21.12 26.58
Df.Hansen Test 31 30 31 30
P-value Hansen Test 0.529 0.609 0.909 0.645
Notes : The dependent variable is the tax revenue-to-GDP ratio. The equation
is estimated by system GMM. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent level, respectively. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses below the coefficients.
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negative effects for GDP per capita and the agriculture output share [see Columns (3)
and (4)]. The negative interaction term of GDP per capita suggests that more developed
economies gain less from adopting a flat tax, probably because their revenue structures
are already well-developed. The negative sign of the agriculture output share interaction
term implies that adopting a flat tax in agricultural societies decreases tax revenue. We
also find a significantly positive effect for institutional quality, suggesting that adopting
the flat income tax will increase tax revenue if the country is characterized by better in-
stitutional quality. As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, low tax compliance (a larger size of the
shadow economy) is usually associated with weak institutions. Under weak institutions,
reduction in PIT rates and simplifying tax structure (reducing number of tax brackets
and removing tax reliefs) may not bring a desired reduction in the shadow economy
as the benefits of the formal sector remain low, and the cost of tax evasion are hardly
affected. Therefore, flat tax reforms in poorly governed societies fail to enhance tax rev-
enue performance. Finally, concerning other control variables, we find a positive effect
of the party orientation on tax revenue. Left parties have redistributive motivations to
support low-income groups by collecting more tax revenue. As discussed in Hypothesis 4
in Section 3.2.3, a government with left-leaning social preferences will collect tax revenue
more efficiently under a non-linear tax system. We also find that resource wealth tends
to modestly increase tax revenue, confirming the results in Column (2). The remaining
control variables, such as the level term of institutional quality, the IMF dummy, and
population composition do not affect revenue performance.
It is worth noticing that the effect of the flat tax dummy on tax revenue becomes
significant only after including its interaction terms with economic variables and insti-
tutional quality. The possible explanation is that the effect of a level term is amplified
if it is interacted with other variables. As shown in Column (3) and (4) in Table 3.5,
the signs of the level term (the flat tax dummy) and its interaction terms are opposite,
indicating a weak overall effect of the flat tax adoption. The weak overall effect confirms
the insignificant effect of the flat tax dummy on tax revenue. Therefore, it is hard to
reach the conclusion how the flat tax adoption will actually influence tax revenue.
At the end of Table 3.5, We also report four additional tests: Sargan test, Hansen
test, AR(1) and AR(2) tests. The Sargan test has a null hypothesis of “the instruments
as a group are exogenous”. Hansen J statistic is reported with the same null hypothesis
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as the Sargan test. P values from both tests indicate that instruments in all models in
Table 3.5 are valid. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of
no autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced residuals. The test for AR(1) process
in first differences rejects the null hypothesis, while the test for AR(2) in first differences,
which is more important, detects no autocorrelation.
3.5. Conclusions
Although the remarkable spread of the flat tax across the world has proven itself to
be one of the most significant tax reforms in recent years, it attracted relatively little
attention in the academic literature. Using a panel of 75 countries for the period 1990–
2011, we study the causes and revenue consequences of flat tax adoption. We use Cox’s
proportional hazard model to model a country’s adoption decision, while the revenue
impact is estimated by using a generalized method of moments approach.
The results for the adoption equation justifies existence of a copycat effect, implying
that a country is more likely to adopt a flat tax if other countries in the region have
already done so. We also find that a country is more likely to adopt the flat tax system
with lower institutional quality, participation in an IMF lending program, and right-
leaning social preferences. For the revenue equation, after controlling interaction terms
as well as a full set of covariates, the dummy for the presence of a flat tax proves to be
significantly positive. In addition, adopters of a flat tax raise more revenue if the country
features lower income, smaller size of agriculture sector, and higher institutional quality.
The analysis in the paper could be developed further in several directions. First, in
order to capture the cross-section dependence, we can estimate a spatial econometric
model. Such a model provides an alternative way to investigate strategic interaction
between neighboring countries. To this end, we will use a spatial weighting matrix which
is applied to neighboring countries’ flat tax dummies. The weighting matrix reflects the
degree to which other countries influence a given country’s flat tax adoption decision.
Defining a weighting matrix is a standard practice in the spatial econometrics literature,
which allows for a reduction of the large number of parameters that otherwise need to
be estimated.
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Second, more political variables could be included to explore the role of a country’s
political system in the flat income tax adoption decision as well as tax revenue. For
example, it is interesting to study whether the governance system (parliamentary or
presidential) would influence the flat tax adoption decision. Also, the flat income tax
reforms usually occurred in the wake of an election year. For western countries, with a
strong focus on equity, the introduction of a flat tax with scaled back personal exemptions
and deductions will be politically difficult.
Last but not least, we do not separate individual tax revenue from tax revenue, which
is more relevant with the flat income tax reform. It is noticeable that the flat income
tax reform usually belongs to one part of a whole reform package of the tax system.




Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Flat tax dummy 1,425 0.105 0.306 0.000 1.000
GDP per capita (logarithm) 1,342 1.027 0.475 -0.400 1.890
Agricultural share 1,264 10.323 10.849 0.260 65.860
Openness 1,425 85.862 48.541 0.000 324.327
Copycat effect 1,425 10.728 17.047 0.000 64.286
Institutional quality 1,097 0.398 0.995 -2.068 1.956
IMF dummy 1,425 0.277 0.448 0.000 1.000
Party orientation dummy 1,337 1.478 1.192 0 3
Tax revenue (logarithm) 1,020 1.418 0.344 -0.551 3.281
Population (logarithm) 1,425 0.831 0.776 -1.166 3.127
Population share of young 1,406 23.745 8.676 13.358 49.123
Population share of old 1,406 10.741 4.877 1.028 22.687
Natural resources 1,422 0.564 2.975 0.000 24.542
EU 1,425 0.227 0.419 0.000 1.000
AS 1,425 0.107 0.309 0.000 1.000
AF 1,425 0.053 0.225 0.000 1.000
CBRO 1,425 0.373 0.484 0.000 1.000
NMED 1,425 0.053 0.225 0.000 1.000
AP 1,425 0.080 0.271 0.000 1.000
SI 1,425 0.107 0.309 0.000 1.000


























Table A.2: Country Composition of the Sample
EU AS AF CBRO AP NMED SI
Austria Canada Mauritius Albania Australia Iraq Aruba
Belgium Costa Rica Rwanda Armenia China Kuwait Barbados
Denmark Haiti Uganda Azerbaijan Japan Qatar Belize
Finland Panama Zimbabwe Belarus Korea, Republic of Turkey Cyprus
France Mexico Bosnia Mongolia Iceland
Germany Trinidad and Tobago Bulgaria New Zealand Malta






















Notes: The countries are classified according to Ebrill et al. (2001), see Table A1.1. AS denotes the Americas, AF represents Sub-Saharan
Africa, EU stands for European Union (i.e., the 15 old EU members plus Norway and Switzerland), CBRO denotes Central Europe and the
former Soviet Union, NMED represents North Africa and Middle East, AP denotes Asia and Pacific, and SI are Small Islands (jurisdictions with








Table A.3: Data Description and Sources
Variable Description Primary Source
Flat tax dummy Dummy variable taking on a value of unity if a flat tax is
present and zero otherwise)
Author’s calculation based IBFD
website
GDP per capita The logarithm of real GDP per capita at purchasing power
parity (in thousands of US dollars)
World Bank (2012), World
Development Indicators
Agricultural share Value added of the agricultural sector as a share of GDP. World Bank (2012), World
Development Indicators
Openness Sum of the value of exports and imports of goods and ser-
vices as a share of GDP.
World Bank (2012), World
Development Indicators
Copycat effect The proportion of other countries in the region that have
already adopted the flat income tax.
Authors’ Calculations
Institutional quality The average indicator of six dimensions of governance (i.e.,
voice and accountability, political stability, government ef-
fectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of
corruption), which are measured in units ranging from -2.5
to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better gover-
nance outcomes. Missing values for the years 1997, 1999,
2001, and 2003 are interpolated




Kaufmann et al. (2008) for further
details.
IMF dummy Dummy variable taking on a value of unity if there is an
IMF lending arrangements (i.e., Stand-by Arrangement, Ex-




























Table A.3: Data Description and Sources (Continued)
Variable Description Primary Source
Party orientation dummy Party orientation with respect to economic policies. Right (R) is
for parties that are defined as conservative, Christian democratic,
or right-wing; Left (L) is for parties that are defined as communist,
socialist, social democratic, or left-wing; Center (C) is for parties
that are defined as centrist or when party position can best be
described as centrist; 0 is for all those cases which do not fit into
the above-mentioned category. R=1, L=3, and C=2.
Database of Political Institutions
(Philip Keefer, 2009)
federation dummy Dummy variable taking on a value of unity for federal countries
and zero otherwise.
Treisman (2008) available at:
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/
polisci/faculty/treisman/
Tax revenue The ratio of tax revenue to GDP (in percent). IMF, Government Finance Statistics,
IMF Staff Reports, IMF Selected
Issues Papers, FAD’s Internal
database and OECD.StatExtracts
http://stats.oecd.org)
Population Total population (in millions). World Bank (2012), World
Development Indicators
Population share of young Population 14 or younger as a fraction of the total population. World Bank (2012), World
Development Indicators
Population share of old Population 65 or over as a fraction of the total population. World Bank (2012), World
Development Indicators
Natural resources Subsoil assets (in thousands of 2000 US dollars per capita). The
value of subsoil assets is kept constant across years.
World Bank (2005)
Regional dummies AS (Americas), AF (Sub-Saharan Africa), EU (15 European
Union member states plus Norway and Switzerland), CBRO (Cen-
tral Europe and the ex-Soviet Union), NMED (North Africa and
Middle East), AP (Asia and Pacific), and SI (Small Islands)
Ebrill et al. (2001), Table A1.1
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Chapter 4
Does the tax policy affect the
credit spread? Evidence from the
U.S. and U.K.18
4.1. Introduction
The credit spread is the difference between the loan rate and the deposit rate, and
this value skyrocketed internationally during the 2008 debt crisis. After the collapse of
Lehman Brothers, Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010) reported that the spread between
unsecured deposit rates (EURIBOR) and overnight indexed swap (OIS) rates for three-
month maturity approached 200 basis points in the Euro Area. Analogous spreads
were even higher in the U.S. and U.K. This phenomenon supports the findings in the
empirical literature that the credit spread widens during downturns (Gertler and Lown,
1999; Aliaga-Dı́az and Olivero, 2010).
There have been many theoretical studies of the relationship between bank lending,
credit spreads, and the business cycle. Some studies concentrate on the implications of
lending relationships for monetary policy-making, introducing a cost-channel effect that
affects the marginal cost of firms and links the behavior of inflation to that of interest
rates; see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Ravenna and Walsh (2006), and
Chowdhury, Hoffmann, and Schabert (2006). This literature assumes a zero probability
of default by the borrower, so there is no role for a financial premium. Other studies focus
on the financial accelerator effects of countercyclical credit spreads. They examine how,
under a positive probability of default, the cost of borrowing is affected by variations in
the borrowers’ net worth and how this mechanism amplifies and propagates shocks to
the economy. This literature follows the pioneering work of Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
18This chapter is coauthored with Zongxin Qian.
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and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (2000).
However, there has been little direct investigation into the relationship between the
fiscal stimulus and credit spreads. Fiscal policies play a rather limited role as a stabilizing
tool in the mainstream business-cycle literature. It is argued that fiscal policies are either
ineffective on the grounds of Ricardian equivalence arguments or inherently not timely.
Since monetary policies are able to maintain both price and output-gap stability, any
policy instrument other than the monetary policy rate is considered to play a minor role
(Blanchard et al., 2010). However, the recent crisis has shown that the monetary-policy
interest rate has almost reached its limits: in many cases, including the U.S. and U.K.,
it was soon effectively at the zero lower bound. Therefore, the role of fiscal stimulus as
a countercyclical policy is now being reconsidered.
We attempt to fill the gap in the literature by exploring how the credit spread reacts
to tax-policy changes. Our paper is analogous to the contribution by Melina and Villa
(2011), which estimates the response of a number of measures of the credit spread to gov-
ernment spending expansion in the U.S. economy. By investigating whether the response
of the credit spread will differ in the presence of a tax-change shock or a government-
spending shock, we can study the impacts of different fiscal-policy shocks on lending
relationships.
Our paper makes three contributions. First, we employ a Romer–Romer narrative
identification approach in combination with a recursive scheme to identify exogenous tax
changes. In analyses of the impacts of fiscal policy changes, the correct identification of
exogenous policy shocks has been widely recognized as crucial. A large empirical litera-
ture relies on the recursive identification scheme, including Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
and Melina and Villa (2011). Although popular, the recursive identification scheme has
been heavily criticized. Romer and Romer (2010) and Cloyne (2011) constructed series
of legislated tax changes on the basis of narrative records from official resources in the
U.S. and U.K. The tax changes, which are intended to boost long-run economic growth
or to deal with inherited budget deficits, are classified as exogenous tax changes. They
are exogenous to output and government-spending shocks. In this paper, we combine the
narrative and recursive approaches for identification. In the structural vector autoregres-
sive (SVAR) models, we first place the exogenous tax changes constructed by Romer and
Romer (2010) and Cloyne (2011), followed by government spending and then by output.
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We assume that the government spending does not react to contemporaneous shocks of
output due to the policy lag, which is a popular assumption in a recursive SVAR. By
doing so, we effectively combine the narrative and recursive approaches.
Second, to see if the U.S. experience applies to other countries, we compare the U.S.
and U.K. Several characteristics make these two countries ideal for a comparative study.
First, in the literature the U.S. is usually considered to be a closed economy, while the
U.K. is regarded as a small open economy. Second, both countries have a long history
of tax policies, and there have been many policy changes. Third, tax policy is highly
centralized in the U.K., but this is not the case in the U.S. Another difference is that
announcements of tax changes almost always become law in the U.K. (Cloyne, 2011).
A recent study by Mertens and Ravn (2012) reveals that anticipated and surprise tax
policies can have different output effects. This implies that the credit spread, which is
related to output fluctuations, can respond differently in countries where announcements
of tax changes have different anticipation effects. A comparative study can assist the-
oretical modeling. It indicates whether or not there is a one-size-fits-all model for tax
changes and credit spread.
Finally, we study the effect of tax-change shocks by estimating the factor-augmented
vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model. Small-scale VAR models include only a few vari-
ables, so they suffer from the limited-information problem and are unlikely to correctly
estimate the fiscal-policy shock. The FAVAR model extends traditional VAR techniques
and uses a large number of variables driven by a much smaller number of economic shocks.
This rich information helps to mitigate the limited-information problem and to eliminate
the omitted-variable bias. Melina and Villa (2011) also use a FAVAR model, but they
use a limited information set to extract factors. In particular, they omit monetary vari-
ables, which are well-known to be related to credit spreads. We extract common factors
from variables that describe all aspects of the general economic situation, including real
activities, inflation, the money market, and asset prices.
Our study covers the period from 1974 to 200619 and we use a quarterly dataset.
We choose 1974 as the starting year because the Bretton Woods system broke down
in 1973, and we thus exclude effects from exchange-rate regime switches. Our sample
19For the U.K., the sample ends in 2005 because the observations of several variables are missing in
that year.
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ends in 2006, the year just before the global financial crisis. We obtain the quarterly
time series of exogenous tax changes in the U.S. from Romer and Romer (2010) and the
values for the U.K. from Cloyne (2011). We construct other variables in the SVAR model
using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the U.S. and the Office for National
Statistics in the U.K. In the FAVAR model, the common U.S. factors are extracted
from the dataset containing 105 macroeconomic time series in Koop (2011), which is an
updated version of the dataset used in Stock and Watson (2008). The common U.K.
factors are extracted from a large dataset, which contains 317 time series.
The impulse responses of the credit spread from FAVAR and SVAR are consistent,
but FAVAR produces more precise estimates, mainly because it uses more information.
There are two main findings. First, in both the U.S. and the U.K., tax-policy shocks
significantly affect the credit spread. Specifically, the credit spread initially responds
positively to an exogenous increase in tax and then declines. Second, these responses are
not completely explained by business-cycle fluctuations induced by tax changes. This has
important theoretical implications. In the existing literature on the relationship between
the business cycle and the credit spread, credit-spread changes amplify the impacts of
various shocks on the output. The countercyclical feature of credit-spread changes is
the source of this amplification effect. However, our results suggest that credit-spread
changes may not always serve as amplifiers or attenuators of tax-policy changes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the baseline SVAR model
and the FAVAR model, briefly introduces the estimation procedure, and discusses the
identification. Section 4.3 describes the data used for the U.S. and U.K. Section 4.4
reports the main estimation results from the two models for the two countries. Section 4.5
provides concluding remarks.
4.2. Empirical specification
This section presents the models, briefly discusses the estimation procedure, and intro-




Many researchers have studied the effects of fiscal-policy shocks by estimating an SVAR
model, but they have not explored how the credit spread reacts to fiscal-policy shocks,
and in particular to tax shocks. Therefore, we first study this issue with the SVAR
model. The model is specified as shown below:
Zt = C + A(L)Zt−1 + ut, t = 1, 2, . . . , T. (4.1)
Here L is the lag operator, and A(L) is the coefficient of the lag matrix, where A(L) =
IK − A1L − . . . − ApL
p. C is a constant, ut is the white-noise process, and Zt =
[∆Tt ∆Gt ∆Yt ∆CSt]
′. ∆Tt represents exogenous tax changes, and ∆Gt and ∆Yt
are two baseline Blanchard–Perotti variables used to study the fiscal-policy effects. They
represent the first-differenced logarithm of the real government spending per capita and
the first-differenced logarithm of the output per capita, respectively. ∆CSt is the credit
spread.
Although SVAR models have long been successfully used in the empirical fiscal-policy
literature, they can be problematic. Some recent work suggests that the classical SVAR
approach suffers from the fiscal foresight problem (see Leeper, Walker, and Yang, 2008;
Mertens and Ravn, 2010; Mertens and Ravn, 2012; Leeper, Richter, and Walker, 2012).
Because of legislative and implementation lags, private agents receive signals from a
preannounced fiscal policy and tend to change their behavior before the policy changes
become effective. Therefore, the information set of the agents in the actual economy
is larger than the information set available to the econometrician analyzing the dataset
generated by the economy. This is referred to as a problem of non-fundamentalness.
Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2008) show that the non-fundamentalness problem will flaw
the estimation results from standard VAR models that include a limited number of
variables. In the presence of fiscal foresight, a fiscal innovation is a discounted sum of
all current and past fiscal news observed by agents. Therefore, the data on actual tax
changes do not convey enough information about the tax-policy innovation.
To deal with non-fundamentalness and the limited-information problem, we use the
FAVAR model proposed by Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005). We attempt to estimate
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where Ft is a vector of unobserved factors that summarize the information about a
country’s economic situation. Zt is a vector of observed variables, and it contains four
variables as in the baseline SVAR model: exogenous tax changes, government spending,
output, and the credit spread. B(L) is a conformable polynomial lag operator, and νt is
an error term.
The unobserved factors F are extracted from a large panel of observable variables,
denoted Xt. The variables in Xt capture the important information about the fundamen-
tals of the economy, and their co-movements depend on unobservable common factors,
F . This gives
Xt = ΛFt + ǫt (4.3)
where Λ is the factor-loading matrix, and ǫt is the disturbance vector with zero mean.
Following common practice, the loadings Λ are identified as eigenvectors (see Bernanke,
Boivin, and Eliasz, 2005).
Equation (4.3) suggests that factors cannot be identified if there are no restrictions,
because it is observationally equivalent to the model with factors F̃t := Q
′Ft and factor
loadings ΛQ, where Q is any orthonormal matrix, i.e., QQ′ = I. Thus, we impose the
normalization restriction Λ′Λ = nI. Alternative normalizations can be found in Stock
and Watson (2005).
4.2.2. Estimation
We adopt a two-step procedure to estimate the FAVAR model. In the first step, we
extract factors via principal component analysis similarly to Bernanke et al. (2005). We
consider two ways of extracting factors. First, we extract different numbers of factors
directly from the whole data set. Second, we divide the whole data set into groups based
on economic intuitions, and then extract one factor from each group. Principal compo-
nent analysis produces static factors with normalized covariances since it is purely based
on factor equation (4.3) without taking into account the dynamics of the factors. One
can alternatively estimate the factors by MCMC estimation. Compared with MCMC
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estimation, the disadvantage of principal component estimation is that it suffers from
sampling error uncertainty since it fails to provide the full posterior of the factors. How-
ever, the principal component method has computational advantages, especially for large
datasets. Furthermore, MCMC estimation requires strong identification restrictions, and
these restrictions may lead to factors with poor economic content. Therefore, we use the
principal component method in our application. After the factors are obtained, we treat
them as if they were observed.
In the second step, we use the estimated factors along with exogenous tax changes,
government spending, output, and credit spread to estimate the VAR model. Since we
extract several factors in the first step and have to include enough lags to adequately
capture the dynamics, there are many free parameters in the VAR system. Typical OLS
or maximum likelihood estimation will suffer from the curse of dimensionality. We follow
Koop and Korobilis (2010) and use Bayesian methods to estimate the FAVAR model.
Bayesian methods are especially useful because the use of a proper prior can lead to a
valid posterior density under weak conditions, even if some parameters are not identified
in the likelihood function (Poirier, 1998). Thus, prior information offers a sensible way
to deal with the large number of parameters in the VAR model. The FAVAR model
is estimated in the state-space form. Equation (4.2) serves as the state equation. The

















M+N ). We consider a conjugate prior for the pa-
rameters, i.e., the loading L follows a normal distribution L ∼ N(0, I), and the elements
in the covariance matrix Σ follow a Gamma distribution σi ∼ G(α, β), where α and β
are both set to the uninformative value 0.01. We use Gibbs sampling to approximate
the posterior distribution in the models.
We implement impulse response analysis to investigate the effect of tax changes, i.e.,
we impose a one-unit increase in the error of the tax equation, and we see how other
variables respond in future periods. The impulse response can be obtained from the
coefficients of the vector moving average representation. For example, the response of
the credit spread h periods from now to the current tax changes will be the coefficient
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of the credit spread in the coefficient matrix of νt−h.
4.2.3. Identification of tax-change shocks
We are interested in studying the effects of a tax-policy shock. However, the key issue
in identifying the macroeconomic effects of tax changes is simultaneity: tax changes are
systematically correlated with other developments affecting output. Tax changes are
likely to affect other macroeconomic variables, while aggregate fluctuations will simul-
taneously affect tax changes. Conventional measures of tax changes (for example, the
cyclically adjusted revenues in Blanchard and Perotti, 2002), will lead to biased esti-
mates of tax policies. The simultaneity problem occurs in both monetary-policy and
fiscal-policy studies.
To avoid the simultaneity problem and biased estimation results, several alterna-
tive identification structures have been proposed for tracing monetary- and fiscal-policy
shocks, including the recursive schemes in Grilli and Roubini (1995), Eichenbaum and
Evans (1995), and Faust and Rogers (2003); the nonrecursive schemes in Cushman and
Zha (1997), Kim and Roubini (2000), and Kim (2001); and the sign restrictions in Canova
(2005) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009).
Our paper employs the newly developed Romer–Romer (RR) identification strat-
egy. The RR approach identifies legislative tax changes from official narrative records,
classifies the motivation for each change, and isolates tax-policy changes that are not
responding to, or influenced by, current or future economic conditions. These legislative
tax changes are said to be “exogenous.” Following the RR identification strategy, Romer
and Romer (2010) and Cloyne (2011) construct narrative datasets for the U.S. and U.K.,
respectively. For the U.S., the exogenous changes are intended to deal with an inher-
ited budget deficit or to achieve long-run goals, such as above-normal growth, increased
fairness, or a smaller role for government. For the U.K., the exogenous changes fall into
four categories: they are intended to boost long-run economic performance, motivated
by ideological or political reasons, enforced by external bodies, or intended to address an
inherited deficit or future deficit consolidation. Although their classifications are slightly
different, they have the same spirit.
Together with the RR identification strategy, we identify the structural shocks using a
recursive scheme. The variables in SVAR are ordered as [∆Tt,∆Gt,∆Yt,∆CSt], and the
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variables in FAVAR are ordered as [∆Fj,t,∆Tt,∆Gt,∆Yt,∆CSt] with j = 1, ...K. This
ordering implies that the tax-change shocks are not affected by government spending
or GDP. Moreover, as proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), government spending
does not react to contemporaneous shocks of output because of the implementation and
decision lags of the budgeting process. Therefore, it is ordered first after the exogenous
tax-change shocks. Ordering the credit spread last allows it to be simultaneously affected
by all structural shocks. Following Bernanke et al. (2005) we orthogonalize the factors
in the FAVAR models, so we put them first in the recursive FAVAR.
4.3. Data
We use quarterly data for our sample countries. We choose 1974, the first year after
the Bretton Woods system broke down, as the starting year, so that we can exclude
effects of exchange-rate regime switches. Our sample ends before 2007, just before the
global financial crisis. Four variables are included in the SVAR models as discussed in
Equation (4.1): exogenous tax changes (T ), the logarithm of government spending per
capita (G), the logarithm of output per capita (Y ), and the credit spread (CS). For the
exogenous tax changes, we obtain U.S. narrative data from Romer and Romer (2010)
and U.K. narrative data from Cloyne (2011). The government spending and output
are obtained for the U.S. from the National Income and Product Accounts and for the
U.K. from the Office for National Statistics (ONS). The variable credit spread comes
from DATASTREAM. It is defined as the difference between the prime lending rate
and the three-month treasury bill rate. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate these variables
for the U.S. and U.K., respectively. The figures show that except for the time series
of exogenous tax changes and the credit spread, the government spending and output
are both nonstationary. Therefore, we take the first difference of these two variables
and transform them to a stationary time series, as shown in Table 4.1. Since all the
other variables capture the change (by definition or via the first difference), we also take
the first-order difference of the credit spread, even though it is stationary. A detailed
description of the data is given in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
To estimate the FAVAR models, we extract factors from two long lists of informa-
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Figure 4.1: U.S. Time Series Plot





US: exogenous tax changes




















Figure 4.2: U.K. Time Series Plot






UK: exogenous tax changes
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Table 4.1: Augmented Dicky Fuller (ADF) Test for Unit Root
Variable P Value Test Statistic Critical Value
U.S. tax 0.0010 -11.783 -1.9429
gov. spending 0.9990 3.477 -1.9429
∆gov.spending 0.0001 -13.178 -1.9430
GDP 0.9990 6.808 -1.9429
∆GDP 0.0001 -7.058 -1.9430
credit spread 0.0296 -2.167 -1.9429
∆credit spread 0.0001 -18.385 -1.9430
U.K. tax 0.0010 -14.595 -1.9426
gov. spending 0.9990 7.920 -1.9426
∆gov.spending 0.0010 -4.565 -1.9427
GDP 0.9990 9.173 -1.9426
∆GDP 0.0023 -3.166 -1.9427
credit spread 0.0010 -4.691 -1.9426
∆credit spread 0.0010 -13.580 -1.9427
tional time series for the U.S. and U.K., respectively. The informational time series we
choose are those used in previous studies on business cycles in these two countries. We
make this choice mainly because in the theoretical literature, changes in the credit spread
are closely related to the business cycle. For the U.S., we use the U.S. quarterly dataset
in Koop (2011). This is an updated version of the dataset used in Stock and Watson
(2008). It consists of 105 quarterly macroeconomic time series, representing several dif-
ferent aspects of the macroeconomy20. The large panel of informational time series for
the U.K. is obtained from Mumtaz and Surico (2009) and DATASTREAM, with 317
series in total. The dataset refers to the U.K. as the “domestic” economy and includes
in the “foreign” countries most of its main trading partners and the major industrial-
ized economies of the world21. In the full panel of 317 variables, 249 foreign time series
contain international real activities, international inflation, international liquidity, and
comovements in international short-term interest rates. There are also 68 U.K. series.22
20The categories used by Koop (2011) cover real output and income; employment and hours; con-
sumption; housing starts and sales; real inventories; stock prices; exchange rate; interest rates; money
and credit quantity aggregates; price indices; average hourly earnings; and consumer expectations. The
original dataset includes 115 time series, but we drop 10 series measuring exactly the same concepts as
variables in Zt.
21The foreign countries are Canada, the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, and
Japan.
22In the original Mumtaz and Surico dataset, there are more U.K. variables. However, many of them
are components of variables at a higher level of aggregation. To make a fair cross-country comparison,
we use only British variables that are at the same level of aggregation as the U.S. variables. However,
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Of these, 55 series cover different real-activity indicators, inflation series including com-
ponents of the retail price index, narrow and broad money, and a set of asset prices such
as house prices and the effective exchange rate. In addition, to make the U.K. data com-
parable to the U.S. data, we obtain from DATASTREAM 13 time series of employment
and hours, housing starts, and consumer expectations. We include foreign time series
because the U.K. is usually considered to be a small open economy, and it is more easily
influenced by external shocks. Following Stock and Watson (2008) and Koop (2011),
all the variables (in both the U.S. and U.K.) are transformed to stationarity either by
differencing or log differencing. Tables A.1 and A.3 in the Appendix provide a full list
and detailed description of the variables (see also Koop (2011) and Mumtaz and Surico
(2009)).
4.4. Estimation results
4.4.1. Estimation results from the SVAR model
We first conduct a univariate analysis to determine the autoregressive order for four
time series (tax, government spending, the output, and the credit spread). The results
in Table 4.2 suggest that for the U.K., three time series (excluding tax) have an optimal
lag length of 3 or 4, while for the U.S., all four time series have an optimal lag length
less than or equal to 2. We choose the order of the lagged variables in the SVAR model
based on various information criteria, i.e., AIC and SIC, as shown in Table 4.3. It shows
that the optimal lag order varies with the criterion. In the U.S., AIC reports an optimal
lag order of 3, while SIC reports an optimal lag order of 2. Since using 3 lag orders only
marginally improves AIC but introduces more parameters, we choose to use 2. In the
U.K., we choose a lag order of 4 for similar reasons.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 present the effect of tax changes on credit spreads in the U.S. and
the U.K., respectively. The bands represent 95% confidence intervals. The tax shock
has an initial positive effect on the credit spreads in both countries, but this impact
declines quickly. The confidence bands are wide, making it difficult to make economic
sense out of the empirical results. Particularly, in the U.K., zero always lies in the 95%
our main results still hold if the original dataset of Mumtaz and Surico is used.
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Table 4.2: Univariate Analysis
U.K. U.S.
AR order BIC AR order BIC
tax 1 0.062 1 -0.008
2 0.084 2 0.035
3 0.124 3 0.079
4 0.149 4 0.114
∆gov.spending 1 -7.286 1 -5.205
2 -7.331 2 -5.263*
3 -7.295 3 -5.247
4 -7.367* 4 -5.226
∆GDP 1 -8.628 1 -6.860
2 -8.590 2 -6.863*
3 -8.568 3 -6.824
4 -8.830* 4 -6.807
∆credit spread 1 1.774 1 3.112
2 1.384 2 2.998*
3 1.370* 3 3.006
4 1.409 4 3.032
Notes : * indicates lag order selected by the criterion; BIC is Bayesian information crite-
rion.
Table 4.3: SVAR Model Lag Order Selection
Lag LogL AIC SC
U.S. 0 598.69 −9.05 −8.92
1 644.94 −9.62 −9.29*
2 663.40 −9.76* −9.24
3 667.96 −9.69 −8.97
4 680.27 −9.74 −8.82
5 683.06 −9.65 −8.53
6 686.93 −9.57 −8.25
7 690.76 −9.49 −7.98
U.K. 0 646.75 −9.22 −9.09
1 679.89 −9.57 −9.25
2 708.05 −9.84 −9.34
3 778.84 −10.73 −10.03
4 810.78 −11.06 −10.17*
5 823.20 −11.11* −10.03
6 827.85 −11.05 −9.78
7 835.52 −11.03 −9.57
Notes : * indicates lag order selected by the criterion; AIC is Akaike information criterion
and SIC is Schwarz information criterion.
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confidence intervals of the impulse responses of the credit spread. Therefore, it is hard
to claim that tax-policy shocks have had significant effects on the British credit spread.
The situation is slightly better in the U.S., where the initial impact of a tax shock on
the credit spread is significant at the 95% level. However, zero is close to all the 95%
confidence intervals of the impulse responses of the credit spread after the first quarter.
Moreover, the impulse responses of the output are not significant.
Figure 4.3: SVAR Estimates for the U.S.
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Impulse response of creditspread
Notes: This figure shows, for the SVAR model and the U.S. sample, the estimated impulse responses to
a one-standard-deviation shock to exogenous tax changes. The solid curve is the estimated coefficient,
and the dashed curves represent standard deviation bands at the 95% confidence level.
4.4.2. Estimation results from the FAVAR model
To address the non-fundamentalness and limited-information issues in the SVAR model,
we estimate the tax-change effect using the FAVAR model and a two-step approach. In
the first step, we extract factors from a large panel of time series. There are two methods
to obtain the factors. The first is to extract factors from the entire data set. The factors
obtained from this approach are not orthogonal, and a variable can contribute to more
than one factor. One advantage is that it does not require a priori knowledge of the
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Figure 4.4: SVAR Estimates for the U.K.
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Notes: This figure shows, for the SVAR model and the U.K. sample, the estimated impulse responses to
a one-standard-deviation shock to exogenous tax changes. The solid curve is the estimated coefficient,
and the dashed curves represent standard deviation bands at the 95% confidence level.
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grouping. However, it may ignore contributions from variables in small groups. The
second method is to group the data and extract one factor from each group, so that the
contribution of the variables to each factor is orthogonal. The orthogonality provides a
clear explanation of each factor, and it takes into account the contributions of variables
from all groups, even small groups. However, this method can cause problems because
each variable contributes to exactly one factor and does not affect other factors, which
imposes a strict restriction.
We use different factor extraction methods for the U.S. and U.K. because the U.S.
is usually considered a closed economy while the U.K. is considered open. In the U.S.
benchmark model, we use the first method: we estimate factors extracted from the
entire panel of U.S. series. In the U.K. model, we follow Mumtaz and Surico (2009)
by treating foreign and domestic (U.K.) series differently. The foreign block consists
of four factors: an international real-activity factor, an international inflation factor, an
international liquidity factor, and comovements in international short-term interest rates.
These international factors appear in the upper N × 4 block of the matrix ΛF , which is
assumed to be block diagonal. The U.K. variables are captured by k domestic factors,
and the domestic factors are extracted from the full panel of the U.K. series, so the
bottom block of ΛF is a full matrix. For robustness checks, we estimate the orthogonal
factors extracted via the second method in both the U.S. and U.K. models.
Another issue is how many factors are needed to capture the information necessary to
properly model the effects of tax changes on credit spread. Although a number of research
discussing how to decide the number of factors present in the data set, for example Stock
and Watson (2002), and Bai and Ng (2002), these methods does not tell how many and
which factors (among the whole set of selected factors) should be included in the model.
Typically, the factors included in the model is a subset of factors extracted from the
data set. Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) suggested including different numbers of
factors in the model and checking the robustness. There are of course other approaches
to deciding which factors to include, such as pretesting or model averaging. In this paper,
we try different specifications and decide the relevant factors based on economic intuition
and statistical evidence. We see from Table 4.4 that for the U.S., the first four factors
explain around 59% of the total variance. For the U.K. domestic series, the first factor
explains around 35% of the total variance, and the first four factors explain around 59%
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of the total variance. Table 4.5 shows that for the foreign series (where the U.K. is the
domestic country), the first factor explains 20% of the variance in the activity and money
groups, 40% in the inflation group, and about 78% in the rates group.
We include four factors in the U.S. benchmark model (no world variables) because
the results obtained using one to three factors (the first to the third) are rather unstable
with large variance, while the results using more than three factors are largely consistent
with more precise estimates. This is because the first four factors jointly explain most of
the economic activities in U.S., and including the fifth (and more) factors does not add
much extra information. In the case of U.K., we include four factors from the foreign
block and one from the domestic block (five factors in total) as the benchmark model.
We include foreign variables because U.K. is an open economy, and the number of factors
included follows Mumtaz and Surico (2009). Different from Mumtaz and Surico (2009),23
we include only one factor in the domestic block in U.K. One reason is that the first factor
explains 35% of the variance, and the next three factors in total explains less than 25%
of the variance. Therefore, we expect including more factors will not largely increase
the explanation power. This is also for the statistical concern, because including many
factors largely increases the number of parameters in the VAR, making the estimation
results rather inefficient. In fact we estimate the specifications with four world factors
and four domestic factors, and find that the results are in general similar, but more
unstable and the estimates have larger variance.
Table 4.4: Explanatory Power of Factors
Factor Eigenvalue % of Variance Explained Cumulative %
U.S. 1 25.6311 22.29 22.29
2 23.8666 20.75 43.04
3 9.9588 8.66 51.70
4 8.3185 7.23 58.93
5 6.1878 5.38 64.32
U.K. 1 23.84 35.06 35.06
2 6.87 10.10 45.16
3 5.41 7.95 53.11
4 3.64 5.35 58.46
5 3.25 4.78 63.64
23They include four from the entire domestic block.
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Figure 4.5: FAVAR Estimates for the U.S.: Benchmark Model
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Notes: This figure shows, for the FAVAR model and the U.S. sample, the estimated impulse responses
to a one-standard-deviation shock to exogenous tax changes. Four factors are extracted from the
entire U.S. dataset (105 variables). The solid curve is the estimated coefficient, and the dashed curves
represent standard deviation bands at the 95% confidence level.
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Figure 4.6: FAVAR Estimates for the U.K.: Benchmark Model
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Notes: This figure shows, for the FAVAR model and the full U.K. sample (317 variables), the estimated
impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation shock to exogenous tax changes. Four orthogonal factors
are extracted from four groups in the foreign block of the U.K. dataset (249 variables, divided into
groups of real activities, inflation, assets, and interest rates), and one factor is extracted from the
entire domestic block (68 variables). The solid curve is the estimated coefficient, and the dashed curves
represent standard deviation bands at the 95% confidence level.
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Table 4.5: Percentage of Variance Explained, U.K. Foreign Series
Factor Activity Inflation Money Rates
World 1 20.35 42.85 20.53 77.70
2 10.59 10.08 12.07 08.30
3 05.85 05.06 09.01 05.46
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the tax-change effects in the U.S. and U.K. We see that the
FAVAR results are more accurate than the SVAR results. Specifically, the confidence
intervals are much narrower. The impulse responses of the credit spread in the U.S.
are clearly significantly different from zero in most of the first seven quarters. Zero is
also clearly excluded from the 95% confidence intervals of the impulse responses for the
U.K. in the first three quarters. The accuracy gains result from the inclusion of more
variables and the extraction of common information that helps to improve the estimation
efficiency and avoid omitted-variable biases.
There are two main findings. First, the credit spread first increases and then de-
creases in both countries. Second, business cycle fluctuations induced by tax policies
cannot alone explain the impulse responses of the credit spread. Major macroeconomic
models such as financial accelerator models suggest that changes in the credit spread
are closely related to business cycle fluctuations. For example, Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999) demonstrate that a boom in output causes the credit spread to decline
and therefore increases investment and amplifies the initial output increase. Conversely,
a bust in output causes the credit spread to increase and therefore decreases invest-
ment and amplifies the initial output drop. In short, in their model the credit spread is
countercyclical and amplifies the business cycle.
Melina and Villa (2011) build a theoretical model to analyze the relationship between
fiscal policy and credit spread. In this model, there is a long-run relationship between the
borrowing firm and its bank. Switching from this long-run relationship incurs a cost for
the firm, and therefore firms are held up by their banks. Melina and Villa (2011) assume
that bank credit is necessary for firms to finance wage bills and investment expenditure.
As a result, the demand for both bank credit and bank deposits declines in economic
downturns, leading to downward adjustments of both the lending and deposit rates.
However, banks can exploit the lending relationship to charge a higher credit spread
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to their relationship firms. In this case, the lending rate declines less than the deposit
rate. In a boom, rising credit and deposit demand increase both the lending and deposit
rates. However, banks would like to make use of the boom to lock more firms into a
lending relationship. Therefore, the lending rate will increase less than the deposit rate
and credit spread decrease.
Fiscal policy affects the credit spread through its impact on the business cycle. Ac-
cording to the theory of Melina and Villa (2011), a tax increase has a negative wealth
effect which makes both consumption and leisure less affordable. The decline in aggre-
gate demand drives down labor demand and the real wage. The increase in labor supply
further pushes down the real wage. A worse economic prospect decreases investment.
This decline in both investment and the wage bill suggests less demand for bank credit.
The indirect demand for deposits also declines. Therefore, both the loan rate and deposit
rate decline. However, there are costs for firms to switch from a lending relationship,
so the hold-up problem exists. During the downturn, banks are less willing to extend
more loans but more willing to exploit the lending relationship, which means charging
a higher spread to the locked-in borrowers. Therefore, the loan rate declines less than
the deposit rate and the credit spread increases. Countercyclical credit spread is also a
feature of this model.
Our empirical results, however, suggest that changes in the credit spread may not
always accord well with the business cycle. In the U.S., the tax change has a positive
impact on the credit spread which increases and arrives at its peak within half a year.
Then the credit spread starts to decline. It does not stop declining at the before-shock
level but continues reducing until the seventh quarter and then starts recovering to the
before-shock level. The impulse responses are almost insignificant after two years. The
initial increase in the credit spread is consistent with Melina and Villa (2011). Its delayed
peak can be explained by habit formation in consumption, which suggests that the initial
decline in aggregate demand and lending demand is contained by people’s unwillingness
to heavily reduce consumption. As a result, the reduction in lending and the increase
in the credit spread are larger in magnitude a few periods after the initial shock when
the effect of habit formation has faded away. As the economy recovers, extending more
loans and locking in new customers become more attractive for the banks. Therefore,
the credit spread gradually declines. The output initially decreases and starts to recover
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after two quarters. The output responses are barely significant from the sixth quarter
onward. The initial decrease in the output is accompanied by an increase in the credit
spread, which is consistent with the theoretical model of countercyclical changes in the
spread. However, the negative responses of the credit spread between the sixth and
eighth quarters are not associated with any significant output responses. There are
clearly some other determinants of credit-spread changes, since these changes are not
completely captured by changes in the output.
The estimation results for the U.K. benchmark model exhibit similar patterns with
some critical differences. In response to a tax-increase shock, the credit spread experi-
ences an initial increase, reaches its peak in about half a year, and then declines. The
response fades out after about the ninth quarter. The impulse responses of the output
are mainly positive before the twelfth quarter and negative afterwards. Compared to the
U.S., the credit-spread changes and output changes in the U.K. are even more weakly
correlated. Particularly interesting is that despite the small initial decline in the output,
most short-term output responses are positive. This is different from the case in the
U.S., and it may reflect an important difference in the tax policies of the two countries.
In the U.K. announced tax changes always become law, but in the U.S. this is not the
case. This implies that the anticipation effect may be stronger in the U.K. than in the
U.S. Mertens and Ravn (2012) find that an anticipated tax cut has a contractionary
effect on output while a surprise tax cut is expansionary. Our result is consistent with
their finding.
There are two possible reasons for the fact that credit-spread responses are not closely
related to output responses. First, the countercyclical movements in the credit spread
predicted by the financial accelerator models and the Mertens and Ravn (2012) model
are offset by cyclical movements generated by the banking attenuator of Goodfriend
and McCallum (2007). They argue that in a boom, deposit demand will increase for
transaction purposes. Therefore, the deposit rate will decrease and the credit spread
will increase. This is called the “banking attenuator.” If the financial accelerator and
the banking attenuator completely offset each other, the credit-spread changes can be
completely acyclical. Second, from a theoretical perspective, there are several channels
through which tax may affect the credit spread in different ways. For example, tax
increases provide more income to the government, and hence they increase the likelihood
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of a government bailout in the event of a bank failure. This can reduce the credit spread.
Tax increases have an even more direct effect on lending and the spread. For corporate
finance, debt can serve as a tax shield, and an increase in tax increases the importance of
a tax shield. This increases the demand for loans relative to direct finance. Suppose that
tax increases also reduce aggregate demand and the corresponding demand for funding.
The tax-shield effect and the business-cycle effect will offset each other.
4.4.3. Robustness checks
FAVAR model with orthogonal factors
As discussed previously, there are two methods for factor extraction. For robustness
checks, we extract orthogonal factors from different groups of variables. Mumtaz and
Surico (2009) group the “foreign” series (with the U.K. as the “domestic” country) into
four groups: world activity, world inflation, world money, and world rates. We also
divide the U.K. data into four groups: real activities, assets, money, and price inflation.
We group the U.S. data into four groups using the same economic concepts.
Table 4.6 presents the percentage of variance explained in each group for the two
countries. For the U.S., the first factor explains more than 30% of the variance in real
activities, 43% in assets, 47% in money, and 63% in price inflation. For the U.K., the first
factor explains around 27% of the variance in real activities, 60% in assets, 52% in money,
and 66% in price inflation. The factors in real activities have a relatively low explanatory
power because this group includes many variables (e.g., output, industrial production,
and consumption) that capture various perspectives of economic activities, and thus one
or two factors may not fully explain a large proportion of the variance. However, the
first factor for each group other than real activities has a rather high explanatory power.
Table 4.6: Percentage of Variance Explained (Orthogonal Factors)
Factor Real activities Assets Money Price inflation
U.S. 1 32.34 42.52 46.97 62.72
2 20.11 14.25 20.97 18.50
3 7.44 13.19 12.34 8.50
U.K. 1 27.19 60.02 51.71 65.85
2 16.03 15.25 14.68 10.85
3 9.66 8.40 12.53 5.11
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Figure 4.7: FAVAR Estimates for the U.S.: Robustness Check
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Notes: This figure shows, for the FAVAR model and the U.S. sample (105 variables), the estimated
impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation shock to exogenous tax changes. Four orthogonal factors
are extracted from four groups (real activities, assets, money, and price inflation) in the full panel of
the U.S. dataset. The solid curve is the estimated coefficient, and the dashed curves represent standard
deviation bands at the 95% confidence level.
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Figure 4.8: FAVAR Estimates for the U.K.: Robustness Check (I)
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Notes: This figure shows, for the FAVAR model and the full U.K. sample (317 variables), the estimated
impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation shock to exogenous tax changes. Four orthogonal factors
are extracted from four groups in the foreign block of the U.K. dataset (249 variables, divided into
groups of real activities, inflation, assets, and interest rates), and four orthogonal factors are extracted
from four groups in the domestic block of the U.K. dataset (68 variables, divided into categories of real
activities, assets, money, and inflation). The solid curve is the estimated coefficient, and the dashed
curves represent standard deviation bands at the 95% confidence level.
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Figure 4.9: FAVAR Estimates for the U.K.: Robustness Check (II)
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Notes: This figure shows, for the FAVAR model and the U.K. subsample (68 variables), the estimated
impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation shock to exogenous tax changes. Four orthogonal factors
are extracted from four groups (real activities, assets, money, and inflation) in the domestic block of
the U.K. dataset. The solid curve is the estimated coefficient, and the dashed curves represent standard
deviation bands at the 95% confidence level.
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Figures 4.7 and 4.8 report the impulse response function for the U.S. and the U.K.
with orthogonal factors. These results support the main findings from the benchmark
model. The credit spread first increases and then declines after the tax increase. More-
over, the changes in the output and the changes in the credit spread are not closely
correlated. The short-run output responses are mainly negative in the U.S. and positive
in the U.K. One difference is that in the U.S. there is now almost no significantly positive
output response while in the benchmark model, there is an output peak in the fourth
quarter after the shock. There is also a new peak of the U.S. credit-spread response
in the fifth quarter. However, the confidence interval is wide and includes zero, so this
is not a significant difference. Another difference is that in the U.K., the credit spread
starts to decline immediately after the initial rise, so the credit-spread response does not
have a delayed peak. From the sixth quarter onward, the response of the credit spread
becomes insignificant.
Role of international factors in the U.K. model
So far we have modeled the U.K. as an open economy. In this subsection, we investigate
how the international factors affect the impulse responses. Specifically, we drop the in-
ternational factors, estimate the FAVAR model for the U.K. with only the four domestic
orthogonal factors (real activities, assets, money, and inflation) and investigate the re-
sulting changes. Figure 4.9 shows the results. Qualitatively, the shape of the impulse
response chart of the credit spread is similar to that of the model with the international
factors. The spread first increases and then starts to decline. A notable difference is
that in the current closed-economy model, there is a significantly positive credit-spread
response in the fifth quarter. In the open-economy model summarized in Figure 4.8,
although there seems to be a positive credit-spread response in the sixth quarter, the
response is not significant. This difference suggests that neglecting the open-economy
feature of the U.K. may overestimate the impact of tax shocks on the credit spread.
Role of the large initial drop in the British credit spread
From Figure 4.2, we see that there was a large drop in the British credit spread at the
beginning of the sample period24. One may suspect that this is an outlier that drives our
24In the four quarters of 1974, the credit spread is close to or even less than -2.
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Figure 4.10: FAVAR Estimates for the U.K.: Robustness Check (III)






Impulse response of tax





Impulse response of gov.spending






Impulse response of output





Impulse response of credit spread
Notes: This figure shows, for the FAVAR model and the U.K. subsample (1975Q3–2005Q4), the
estimated impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation shock to exogenous tax changes. The solid
curve is the estimated coefficient, and the dashed curves represent standard deviation bands at the
95% confidence level.
results. To check the robustness of the results, we drop the first six British observations
and re-estimate the benchmark model. Figure 4.10 summarizes the results. The impulse
responses are unchanged when we drop the potential outliers.
4.5. Conclusions
This paper studies how the credit spread responds to changes in the tax policy in the
U.S. and the U.K. during the period 1974 to 2006. Unlike previous contributions in
fiscal-policy analysis, we combine the Romer–Romer narrative approach and the recur-
sive approach to identify the structural shocks. Thus, our results are less likely to suf-
fer from identification errors. Furthermore, this identification approach is incorporated
in an FAVAR specification. We argue that the FAVAR model overcomes the limited-
information problem in small-scale VAR models and helps to avoid omitted-variable
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biases. By a comparison of the results from SVAR and structural FAVAR estimations,
we demonstrate that the FAVAR model provides more accurate results.
Tax policies have significant impacts on the credit spread. After an unexpected tax
increase, the spread first increases and then declines in both countries. Moreover, the
responses of the credit spread are not closely related to the output responses. This result
suggests that tax-induced business cycle fluctuations are not the main causes of credit-
spread changes after a tax shock. We should take a broader view of the relationship
between tax policies and the credit spread. Interestingly, we find that the short-run
output responses to a tax increase are mainly negative in the U.S. and positive in the
U.K., reflecting the different impacts of the anticipation effect.
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Appendix A: Data
The large panel of informational time series for the U.S. that we used to extract factors is
from Koop (2011), which is an updated version of that used in Stock and Watson (2008).
Except for the financial variables, the variables are seasonally adjusted. All the variables
are transformed to stationarity. The following table provides a brief description of each
variable along with a transformation code (tcode). This code is: 1 = no transformation,
2 = first difference, 3 = second difference, 4 = log, 5 = first difference of logged variables,
6 = second difference of logged variables.
Table A.1: U.S. List of Informational Time Series in FAVAR
Series No. Tcode Series ID Title
1 1 CBI Change in Private Inventories
2 5 FINSLC96 Real Final Sales of Domestic Product, 3 Decimal
3 1 CIVA Corporate Inventory Valuation Adjustment
4 5 CP Corporate Profits After Tax
5 5 CNCF Corporate Net Cash Flow
6 5 FPI Fixed Private Investment
7 5 GSAVE Gross Saving
8 5 PRFI Private Residential Fixed Investment
9 5 CMDEBT Household Sector: Liabilities: Household Credit Market
Debt Outstanding
10 5 INDPRO Industrial Production Index
11 1 NAPM ISM Manufacturing: PMI Composite Index
12 5 HCOMPBS Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour
13 5 HOABS Business Sector: Hours of All Persons
14 5 RCPHBS Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour
15 5 ULCBS Business Sector: Unit Labor Cost
16 5 COMPNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour
17 5 HOANBS Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons
18 5 COMPRNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour
19 5 ULCNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Unit Labor Cost
20 5 UEMPLT5 Civilians Unemployed - Less Than 5 Weeks
21 5 UEMP5TO14 Civilians Unemployed for 5–14 Weeks
22 5 UEMP15OV Civilians Unemployed - 15 Weeks and Over
23 5 UEMP15T26 Civilians Unemployed for 15–26 Weeks
24 5 UEMP27OV Civilians Unemployed for 27 Weeks and Over
25 5 NDMANEMP All Employees: Nondurable Goods Manufacturing
26 5 MANEMP Employees on Nonfarm Payrolls: Manufacturing
27 5 SRVPRD All Employees: Service-Providing Industries
28 5 USTPU All Employees: Trade, Transportation, and Utilities
29 5 USWTRADE All Employees: Wholesale Trade
30 5 USTRADE All Employees: Retail Trade
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Table A.1: U.S. List of Informational Time Series in FAVAR (continued)
Series No. Tcode Series ID Variable
31 5 USFIRE All Employees: Financial Activities
32 5 USEHS All Employees: Education and Health Services
33 5 USPBS All Employees: Professional and Business Services
34 5 USINFO All Employees: Information Services
35 5 USSERV All Employees: Other Services
36 5 USPRIV All Employees: Total Private Industries
37 5 USGOVT All Employees: Government
38 5 USLAH All Employees: Leisure and Hospitality
39 5 AHECONS Average Hourly Earnings: Construction
40 5 AHEMAN Average Hourly Earnings: Manufacturing
41 5 AHETPI Average Hourly Earnings: Total Private Industries
42 1 AWOTMAN Average Weekly Hours: Overtime: Manufacturing
43 1 AWHMAN Average Weekly Hours: Manufacturing
44 4 HOUST Housing Starts: Total: New Privately Owned Housing
Units Started
45 4 HOUSTNE Housing Starts in Northeast Census Region
46 4 HOUSTMW Housing Starts in Midwest Census Region
47 4 HOUSTS Housing Starts in South Census Region
48 4 HOUSTW Housing Starts in West Census Region
49 4 HOUST1F Privately Owned Housing Starts: 1-Unit Structures
50 4 PERMIT New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building Permit
51 5 NONREVSL Total Nonrevolving Credit Outstanding, SA
52 5 OTHSEC Other Securities at All Commercial Banks
53 5 TOTALSL Total Consumer Credit Outstanding
54 5 BUSLOANS Commercial and Industrial Loans at All Commercial Banks
55 5 CONSUMER Consumer (Individual) Loans at All Commercial Banks
56 5 LOANS Total Loans and Leases at Commercial Banks
57 5 LOANINV Total Loans and Investments at All Commercial Banks
58 5 INVEST Total Investments at All Commercial Banks
59 5 REALLN Real Estate Loans at All Commercial Banks
60 1 HHSNTN U. of Mich. index of consumer expectations(bcd-83)
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Table A.1: U.S. List of Informational Time Series in FAVAR (continued)
Series No. Tcode Series ID Variable
61 1 PMI Purchasing Managers’ Index (SA)
62 1 PMNO NAPM New Orders Index (percent)
63 1 PMDEL NAPM Vendor Deliveries Index (percent)
64 1 PMNV NAPM inventories index (percent)
65 5 MOCMQ New Orders (NET) - Consumer Goods and Materials,
1996 Dollars (BCI)
66 5 MSONDQ New Orders, Nondefense Capital Goods, in 1996 Dollars (BCI)
67 5 USGSEC U.S. Government Securities at All Commercial Banks
68 1 TB3MS 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate
69 1 TB6MS 6-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate
70 1 GS1 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
71 1 GS3 3-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
72 1 GS5 5-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
73 1 GS10 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
74 1 MPRIME Bank Prime Loan Rate
75 1 AAA Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield
76 1 BAA Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield
77 5 EXSZUS Switzerland / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate
78 5 EXJPUS Japan / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate
79 5 BOGAMBSL Board of Governors Monetary Base, Adjusted for Changes
in Reserve Requirements
80 5 TRARR Board of Governors Total Reserves, Adjusted for Changes
in Reserve Requirements
81 5 BOGNONBR Non-Borrowed Reserves of Depository Institutions
82 1 NFORBRES Net Free or Borrowed Reserves of Depository Institutions
83 5 M1SL M1 Money Stock
84 5 CURRSL Currency Component of M1
85 5 CURRDD Currency Component of M1 Plus Demand Deposits
86 5 DEMDEPSL Demand Deposits at Commercial Banks
87 5 TCDSL Total Checkable Deposits
88 5 GDPCTPI Gross Domestic Product: Chain-type Price Index
89 5 PPIACO Producer Price Index: All Commodities
90 5 PPICRM Producer Price Index: Crude Materials for Further Processing
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Table A.1: U.S. List of Informational Time Series in FAVAR (continued)
Series No. Tcode Series ID Variable
91 5 PPIFCF Producer Price Index: Finished Consumer Foods
92 5 PPIFCG Producer Price Index: Finished Consumer Goods
93 5 PFCGEF Producer Price Index: Finished Consumer Goods Excluding Foods
94 5 PPIFGS Producer Price Index: Finished Goods
95 5 PPICPE Producer Price Index Finished Goods: Capital Equipment
96 5 PPIENG Producer Price Index: Fuels and Related Products and Power
97 5 PPIIDC Producer Price Index: Industrial Commodities
98 5 PPIITM Producer Price Index: Intermediate Materials:
Supplies and Components
99 5 CPIAUCSL Consumer Price Index For All Urban Consumers: All Items
100 5 CPIUFDSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Food
101 5 CPIENGSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Energy
102 5 CPILEGSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items
Less Energy
103 5 CPIULFSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items
Less Food
104 5 CPILFESL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items
Less Food and Energy
























Table A.2: Data Description and Sources
Variable Description Primary Source
U.S.: Variables in the VAR model
Tax changes exogenous legitimate tax liability
changes as percentage of nominal
GDP (series “EXOGENRRATIO”).
Romer and Romer (2010)
Government spending in logarithm, federal total gross
expenditures less interest payment,
divided by the price index for GDP
and population.
National Income and Product
Accounts, Bureau of Economic
Analysis
Output in logarithm, chain-type quantity
index for GDP divided by
population.
National Income and Product
Accounts, Bureau of Economic
Analysis
Credit spread prime loan rate (series “USQ60P..”)
minus 3-month treasury bill rate
(“USGBILL3”)
. Datastream
U.K.: Variables in the VAR Model
Tax changes exogenous legitimate tax liability
changes as percentage of nominal
GDP (series “exogenous”).
Cloyne (2011)
Government spending in logarithm, total government
expenditure divided by population
and GDP deflator.
Office for National Statistics
Output in logarithm, chained volume GDP
divided by population.
Office for National Statistics
Credit spread prime loan rate (series “UKQ60P..”)




The large panel of information time series for the U.K. that we used to extract factors
is from Mumtaz and Surico (2009) and DATASTREAM. The variables are seasonally ad-
justed and transformed to stationarity. The following table provides a brief description
of each variable along with a transformation code (tcode). This code is: 1 = no transfor-
mation, 2 = first difference, 3 = second difference, 4 = log, 5 = first difference of logged
variables, 6 = second difference of logged variables.
Table A.3: U.K. List of Informational Time Series in FAVAR
Series No. Tcode Country Variable
1 5 U.K. Real nationwide house prices
2 5 U.K. Description: UK FT-Actuaries Dividend Yield (w/GFD extension)
3 5 U.K. Description: UK FT-Actuaries PE Ratio (w/GFD extension)
4 5 U.K. FTSE ALL Share Index
5 5 U.K. Pounds/dollar
6 5 U.K. Pounds/euro
7 5 U.K. Pounds/yen
8 5 U.K. NEER
9 5 U.K. Pounds/Canada dollar
10 5 U.K. Pounds/Australia
11 1 U.K. Government bond yields: 3-month maturity
12 1 U.K. Government bond yields: 6-month maturity
13 1 U.K. Government bond yields: 9-month maturity
14 1 U.K. Government bond yields: 12-month maturity
15 1 U.K. Government bond yields: 15-month maturity
16 1 U.K. Government bond yields: 18-month maturity
17 1 U.K. Government bond yields: 21-month maturity
18 1 U.K. Government bond yields: 24-month maturity
19 1 U.K. Government bond yields: 30-month maturity
20 1 U.K. Government bond yields: 36-month maturity
21 1 U.K. Government bond yields: 48-month maturity
22 1 U.K. Government bond yields: 60-month maturity
23 1 U.K. Government bond yields: 72-month maturity
24 1 U.K. Government bond yields: 84-month maturity
25 1 U.K. Government bond yields: 96-month maturity
26 1 U.K. Government bond yields: 108-month maturity
27 5 U.K. General Government: Final consumption expenditure
28 5 U.K. Balance of Payments: Trade in Goods and Services: Total exports
29 5 U.K. Balance of Payments: Imports: Total Trade in Goods and Services
30 5 U.K. Total Gross Fixed Capital Formation
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Table A.3: U.K. List of Informational Time Series in FAVAR (continued)
Series No. Tcode Country Variable
31 5 U.K. IOP: Industry D: Manufacturing: CVMSA NAYear
32 5 U.K. IOP: Industry C,D,E: All Production Industries
33 5 U.K. Consumption Expenditure
34 5 U.K. Business Investment
35 5 U.K. Trade Balance
36 2 U.K. UK Unemployment Rate SADJ
37 2 U.K. UK LFS: Economic Inactivity Rate, All,
Aged 16 & Over SADJ
38 2 U.K. UK LFS: Economic Inactivity Rate, All, Aged 16-64 SADJ
39 2 U.K. UK LFS: Economic Activity Rate, All, Aged 16–64 SADJ
40 2 U.K. UK LFS: Employment Rate, All, Aged 16 & Over SADJ
41 2 U.K. UK LFS: Unemployment Rate, All, Aged 16 & Over SADJ
42 2 U.K. UK Unemployment Claimant Count VOLA
43 2 U.K. UK Unit Labour Cost Index – Whole Economy SADJ
44 2 U.K. UK Productivity – Whole Economy SADJ
45 2 U.K. UK GFK Consumer Confidence Index NADJ
46 2 U.K. UK CLI New Car Registrations VOLA
47 2 U.K. UK New Construction Orders - total CURN
48 2 U.K. UK New Orders Obtained - New Work (total) CONA
49 5 U.K. RPI Total Food
50 5 U.K. RPI Total Non-Food
51 5 U.K. RPI Total All items Other than Seasonal Food
52 5 U.K. GDP Deflator
53 5 U.K. Wages
54 5 U.K. CPI
55 5 U.K. Consumption Deflator
56 5 U.K. Gross Value Added by Agriculture, Forestry, and fishing
57 5 U.K. Gross Value Added by Production
58 5 U.K. Gross Value Added by Construction
59 5 U.K. Gross Value Added by Service Industries
60 5 U.K. Import Prices
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Table A.3: U.K. List of Informational Time Series in FAVAR (continued)
Series No. Tcode Country Variable
61 5 U.K. Export Prices
62 5 U.K. Total M4 , PNFC(Private non-financial corporation)
63 5 U.K. M4
64 5 U.K. OFC (Other Financial Corporation) M4
65 5 U.K. Household M4
66 5 U.K. PNFC M4 Lending
67 5 U.K. OFC M4 Lending
68 5 U.K. Household M4 Lending
69 5 Canada GDP
70 5 Japan GDP
71 5 France GDP
72 5 Germany GDP
73 5 Italy GDP
74 5 Austria GDP
75 5 Belgium Industrial Production, SEAS.ADJ
76 5 Finland GDP
77 5 Ireland Industrial Production, SEAS ADJ 2000=100
78 5 Luxembourg Industrial Production
79 5 Netherlands Industrial Production SA
80 5 Portugal Industrial Production, SEAS ADJ
81 5 Spain Gross Domestic Product SA
82 5 Australia Real GDP
83 5 Norway Real GDP
84 5 Canada Industrial Production, SEAS ADJ
85 5 Japan Industrial Production, SEAS ADJ
86 5 France Industrial Production, SEAS ADJ
87 5 Germany Industrial Production, SEAS ADJ
88 5 Italy Industrial Production, SEAS ADJ
89 5 Austria Industrial Production, SEAS ADJ
90 5 Finland Industrial Production, SEAS ADJ
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Table A.3: U.K. List of Informational Time Series in FAVAR (continued)
Series No. Tcode Country Variable
91 5 Spain Industrial Production, SEAS ADJ
92 5 Norway Industrial Production, SEAS ADJ
93 5 Sweden Industrial Production, SEAS ADJ
94 1 Australia Unemployment
95 1 Austria Unemployment
96 1 Belgium Unemployment
97 1 Canada Unemployment
98 1 Finland Unemployment
99 1 France Unemployment
100 1 Germany Unemployment
101 1 Italy Unemployment
102 1 Japan Unemployment
103 1 Netherlands Unemployment
104 1 Norway Unemployment
105 1 Spain Unemployment
106 5 Australia Exports of goods and services SA
107 5 Australia Gross Fixed Capital Formation SA
108 5 Australia Househ.Cons.Expend.,Incl.NPISHS SA
109 5 Australia Imports Of Goods And Services SA
110 5 Australia Gross National Income SA
111 5 Canada Exports Of Goods And Services SA
112 5 Canada Gross Fixed Capital Formation SA
113 5 Canada Househ.Cons.Expend.,Incl.NPISHS SA
114 5 Canada Imports Of Goods And Services SA
115 5 Canada Gross National Income SA
116 5 Japan Exports Of Goods And Services SA
117 5 Japan Gross Fixed Capital Formation SA
118 5 Japan Househ.Cons.Expend.,Incl.NPISHS SA
119 5 Japan Imports Of Goods And Services SA
120 5 Japan Gross National Income SA
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Table A.3: U.K. List of Informational Time Series in FAVAR (continued)
Series No. Tcode Country Variable
121 5 Germany Gross Fixed Capital Formation SA
122 5 Germany Househ.Cons.Expend.,Incl.NPISHS SA
123 5 Germany Gross National Income SA
124 5 France Exports Of Goods And Services SA
125 5 France Gross Fixed Capital Formation SA
126 5 France Househ.Cons.Expend.,Incl.NPISHS SA
127 5 France Imports Of Goods And Services SA
128 5 Italy Exports
129 5 Italy Imports
130 5 Italy Gross Fixed Capital Formation SA
131 5 Norway Gross Fixed Capital Formation SA
132 5 Norway Househ.Cons.Expend.,Incl.NPISHS SA
133 5 Norway Gross National Income SA
134 5 US Emp(construction)
135 5 US Emp(health and education)
136 5 US Emp(financial services)
137 5 US Emp(good producing)
138 5 US Emp(government)
139 5 US Emp(information services)
140 5 US Emp(leisure)
141 5 US Emp(natural resources mining)
142 5 US Emp(other services)
143 5 US Emp(professional and business services)
144 5 US Emp(retail trade)
145 5 US Emp(service providing ind)
146 5 US Emp(trade transporatation untilities)
147 5 US Emp(wholesale trade)
148 5 US Civilian Employment: Sixteen Years & Over
149 5 US Civilian Employment: Sixteen Years and Over
150 5 US Civilian Labour Force
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Table A.3: U.K. List of Informational Time Series in FAVAR (continued)
Series No. Tcode Country Variable
151 5 US Civilian Participation Rate
152 5 US Civilians Unemployed - 15 Weeks and Over
153 5 US Civilians Unemployed - Less Than 5 Weeks
154 1 US Civilian Unemployment Rate
155 5 US Total Non-Farm Payrolls
156 5 US Unemployed: 16 Years and Over
157 5 US IP Index fred
158 5 US Real Personal Consumption Expenditure
159 5 US Real Personal Consumption Expenditure (Durable Goods)
160 5 US Real Personal Consumption Expenditure (Non-Durable Goods)
161 5 US Real Personal Consumption Expenditure (Services)
162 5 US Real Private Non-Residential Fixed Investment
163 5 US Real Private Residential Fixed Investment
164 5 US Real Disposable Personal Income
165 5 US Real Exports of Goods and Services, 3 Decimal
166 5 US Real Gross Domestic Product
167 5 US Real Gross National Product
168 5 US Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, 3 Decimal
169 5 US Real Imports of Goods and Services
170 5 US Real Private Fixed Investment
171 5 US Housing Starts: Total: New Privately Owned Housing Units Started
172 5 US Privately Owned Housing Starts: 1-Unit Structures
173 5 US ISM Manufacturing: PMI Composite Index
174 5 Canada CPI:All Cities POP OVR.30,000
175 5 Canada GDP Deflator (2000=100)
176 5 Japan CPI:All Japan-485 Items
177 5 Japan GDP Deflator (2000=100)
178 5 Germany GDP Deflator (2000=100)
179 5 Germany CPI Unified Germany
180 5 France CPI: 108 Cities
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Table A.3: U.K. List of Informational Time Series in FAVAR (continued)
Series No. Tcode Country Variable
181 5 France GDP Deflator (2000=100)
182 5 Italy CPI:ALL Italy
183 5 Austria CPI 20 Towns
184 5 Austria GDP Deflator (2000=100)
185 5 Belgium CPI:All Groups,62 Centers
186 5 Finland CPI: All Country
187 5 Greece CPI:Urban Areas
188 5 Ireland CPI: All Items
189 5 Luxembourg Luxembourg-Consumer Prices
190 5 Netherlands CPI:Wage Earners,Median INC.
191 5 Portugal CPI Continental
192 5 Spain CPI: (No Specifics AVAIL.)
193 5 Sweden CPI Urban And Rural Areas
194 5 Spain CPI: (No Specifics AVAIL.)
195 5 Australia CPI: All Groups, Six Capitals
196 5 Australia GDP Deflator (2000=100)
197 5 Norway CPI: National All Consumers
198 5 Norway GDP Deflator (2000=100)
199 5 Canada Wages: Hourly Earnings
200 5 Canada Import Prices
201 5 Australia Wages
202 5 Australia Import Prices
203 5 Japan Wages: Monthly Earnings
204 5 Japan Import Prices
205 5 Germany Wages And Salaries Per Manhour
206 5 Germany Import Prices
207 5 Italy Contr Wage/Person EX FAM ALLO
208 5 Italy Unit Value Of Imports
209 5 Austria Imports CIF
210 5 Austria Earnings Manufacturing and Mining
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Table A.3: U.K. List of Informational Time Series in FAVAR (continued)
Series No. Tcode Country Variable
211 5 Belgium BG Hourly Earnings Males: Industry SADJ
212 5 Finland FN Hourly Earnings - Manufacturing NADJ
213 5 Finland FN Imports CIF (IN US$) CURN
214 5 Ireland IR Hourly Wages NADJ
215 5 Ireland IR Import Unit Value NADJ
216 5 Netherlands Wages: Hourly Rates
217 5 Netherlands Import Prices
218 5 Portugal Import Prices
219 5 Spain Hourly Wages
220 5 Spain Import Prices
221 5 Sweden AV.HRLY Earnings MANUF SNI3
222 5 Sweden Import Price Index
223 5 Norway Import Prices
224 5 US Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator
225 5 US Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items
226 5 US Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Energy
227 5 US Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Food
228 5 US Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Energy
229 5 US CPI index Deifinition unknown
230 5 US Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items
Less Food & Energy
231 5 US Producer Price Index: All Commodities
232 5 US Producer Price Index: Finished Consumer Foods
233 5 US Producer Price Index: Finished Consumer Goods Excluding Foods
234 5 US Producer Price Index: Finished Goods
235 5 US Producer Price Index Finished Goods: Capital Equipment
236 5 US Producer Price Index: Fuels and Related Products and Power
237 5 US Producer Price Index: Industrial Commodities
238 5 US Wages: Hourly Earnings, MFG
239 5 US Export Price Index
240 5 US Import Price Index
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Table A.3: U.K. List of Informational Time Series in FAVAR (continued)
Series No. Tcode Country Variable
241 5 US Description: Economist All-Commodity Dollar Index
242 5 Euro Area M1
243 5 Euro Area M3
244 5 Canada M1, Seasonally Adjusted
245 5 Canada GROSS M1, Seasonally Adjusted
246 5 Canada M1++, Seasonally Adjusted
247 5 Canada M2, Seasonally Adjusted
248 5 Canada M2+, Seasonally Adjusted
249 5 Canada M2++, Seasonally Adjusted
250 5 Canada M3, Seasonally Adjusted
251 5 Japan M1, Seasonally Adjusted
252 5 Japan M2 + CDs, Seasonally Adjusted
253 5 Sweden M3
254 5 Spain M1
255 5 Spain M2
256 5 Spain M3
257 5 Spain ALP(Broad Money)
258 5 Australia M3, Seasonally Adjusted
259 5 Austria MONEY, M1
260 5 Germany Central Bank Money, S.A.
261 5 Germany M1, Seasonally Adjusted
262 5 Germany Money M2 S.A.
263 5 Germany Money M3, S.A.
264 5 Netherlands M2:National Definition
265 5 Norway Broad Money(M2), UNADJ.
266 1 Canada Money
267 1 Japan Money
268 1 Australia Money
269 1 US Money
270 5 US Currency Component of M1
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Table A.3: U.K. List of Informational Time Series in FAVAR (continued)
Series No. Tcode Country Variable
271 5 US Monetary Base, SeasonaLLY ADJUSTED
272 5 US Domestic Credit
273 5 US Money
274 5 US Domestic Credit
275 5 US M1 Seasonally Adjusted
276 5 US M2 Seasonally Adjusted
277 5 US M3 Seasonally Adjusted
278 5 US Currency Component Of M1 Plus Demand Deposits
279 5 US Demand Deposits At Commercial Banks
280 5 US Money Zero Maturity (MZM) (Not a Press Release)
281 5 US Total Time And Savings Deposits at All Depository Institutions
282 5 US Total Checkable Deposits
283 5 US Currency In Circulation
284 1 France T-bill rate
285 1 Germany T-bill rate
286 1 Belgium Treasury Paper
287 1 Finland Central Bank Rate
288 1 Netherlands Central Bank Rate
289 1 Austria Central Bank Rate
290 1 Portugal Central Bank Rate
291 1 Spain Central Bank Rate
292 1 Sweden Central Bank Rate
293 1 US US Discount Rate (EP)
294 1 US US Federal Funds Rate NADJ
295 1 US US Lending Rate (Prime Rate)
296 1 US US Prime Rate Charged By Banks
297 1 US US Treasury Bill Rate
298 1 US US 3 Month Interbank Rate (London) (Mth.Avg.)
299 1 Japan JP Average Contracted Discount Rate - All Banks
300 1 Japan JP Average Contracted General Rate
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Table A.3: U.K. List of Informational Time Series in FAVAR (continued)
Series No. Tcode Country Variable
301 1 Japan JP Average Contracted Loan Rates - Alm Banks
302 1 Japan JP Central Bank Discount Rate NADJ
303 1 Japan JP Postal Ordinary Savings Deposit Rate
304 1 Japan JP Lending Rate (Prime Rate)
305 1 Italy IT Discount Rate / Short Term Euro Repo Rate (Mth.Avg.)
306 1 Italy IT Govt Bond Yield - Medium Term
307 1 Italy IT Interbank Deposit Rate - Average On 3-Month Deposits
308 1 Italy IT Treasury Bond Net Yield - Secondary Mkt. (EP)
309 1 Australia AU Money Market Rate (Federal Funds)
310 1 Australia AU Yield 90-Day Bank - Accepted Bills NADJ
311 1 Australia AU Treasury Bill (T-Bill) Rate - 3 Month (EP)
312 1 Australia AU Bank Accepted Bills - 90 Days
313 1 Canada CN Central Bank Rate NADJ
314 1 Canada CN Interest Rates: 3 Month T-Bill Tender (End Month)
315 1 Canada CN Commercial Paper Rate
316 1 Canada CN Interest Rates: 1 Month Prime Corp. Paper (End Month)
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